October 22, 1914] 



NATURE 



21 



tion of wisdom in the State and therefore in educa- 

 lion. 



Clearly, two new forces are at work in the world : 

 not science alone but also a broad and altruistic 

 Socialism, both the outcome of the intellectual freedom 

 man has acquired since the deposition of the 

 Churches. The one is gradually leading us to base 

 our actions upon knowledge and to be practical 

 through the use of theory-; the other is leading us 

 gradually, though slowly, to have consideration for 

 one another, to recognise how helpless are the 

 majority, how greatly they stand in need of the guid- 

 mce of the few who are capable of leading. But we 

 -hall need to order our Socialism by science to make 

 ;- a wise Socialism. The signs are only too numerous 

 :iiat a wave of political despotism may come over us. 

 Either, as time goes on, science will be more and 

 more of service in guiding the social machine — or that 

 nachine will perish, from the very complexity of its 

 rganisation and the inability of the units to under- 

 stand their place, to understand the need of subor- 

 dinating their individual inclinations to communal 

 interests; most important of all, to understand their 

 inability to recognise and require competent leadership 

 — for science is aristocratic in its tendencies : indeed, 

 I shall claim that real science — wisdom — is for the 

 very few. 



With all the marvellous growth of achievement to 

 which I have referred, there has been no proportionate 

 growth of public intelligence. Our Admiralty, and to 

 a far less extent our War Office, have called science 

 into their service, but our public departments generally 

 will have none of it. Even the elements of an under- 

 standing of the methods of science are not thought 

 to be essential to the education of a Civil Servant ; 

 such knowledge is not required even in the highest 

 branches of the Indian Service — no politician is for 

 one moment supposed to need it : we are governed 

 almost entirely by the literary spirit. 



The spirit of the age, in fact, is in no way scien- 

 tific, though ease and comfort are now provided on 

 an unprecedented scale through the agency of science, 

 the engineer acting as chief interpreter. Why do we 

 still go naked and unashamed of our ignorance of 

 " science " ? One main reason is that the party in 

 power is unscientific ; but at bottom, I believe, the 

 difficulty is a far greater one and probably innate 

 in our disposition. It cannot well be supposed that 

 man is by nature disposed to be scientific. 

 The scientific fraternity, at any time, are, and 

 probably always will be, but a small party — a set 

 of freaks, sports from the multitude. They think and 

 talk in a language of their own, as musicians do. 

 The multitude may listen to them at times, with more 

 or less of pleasure, as they do to music ; but it is 

 mpossible, and probably always will be impossible, 

 or the many to appreciate the methods and results 

 f the scientific worker. Science, in reality, is a form 

 f art and true artists are never numerous; moreover, 

 : is admitted that they are born — like Topsy, they 

 must grow, for they are not to be made in numbers. 

 Our schools are for the most part in literary hands : 

 and it would almost appear that literarv and scientific 

 interests are antagonistic, so unsympathetic has been 

 the reception accorded to science by the schools. 



Parenthetically, let me here deny the accusation not 

 infrequently made by literary' writers that the scientific 

 fraternity are trying to oust literary studies from the 

 schools. Nothing could be further from the truth. 

 We are always craving for better literary training ; 

 our complaint is that the methods and subject-matter 

 of literary training are far from being properly de- 

 veloped and, especially, that English is neglected in 

 the schools. Huxlev stated the real situation in sav- 





NO. 2347, VOL. 94] 



ing, " Science and literature are not two things but 

 two sides of the same thing." 



The rise of science is due to the introduction of the 

 experimental method. Mr. Balfour, in arguing, as 

 he has done recently, that science rests upon many 

 unprovable postulates and therefore does not differ in 

 method from metaphysics, has made assertions which 

 cannot be allowed to pass as correct. True science 

 rests wholly upon fact and upon logic : all else is 

 mere provisional hypothesis — a garment we are pre- 

 pared to put aside at any moment if cause be shown. 

 We are well aware that human nature is always 

 intervening to spoil our work ; it is human to err and 

 false doctrine may easily occupy the attention for a 

 time, but we are fully conscious of our limitations 

 and prepared to admit them, whilst we feel that we 

 are ever advancing towards security of knowledge. 



The method of science, indeed, is the method of the 

 Chancery Court — it involves the collection of all avail- 

 able evidence and the subjection of all such evidence 

 to the most searching examination and cross-examina- 

 tion. False evidence may be tendered and for the 

 time being accepted ; but sooner or later the perjun," 

 is discovered. Our method, in fact, goes beyond that 

 of the courts : we are not only always prepared to 

 reconsider our judgments but always searching for 

 fresh evidence; we dare to be positive only when, time 

 after time, the facts appear to warrant a definite 

 conclusion. But there are few instances in which we 

 have travelled so far. The Newtonian theon,- of gravi- 

 tation, the Daltonian theory of atoms, are two strik- 

 ing examples of generalisations which fit all the facts, 

 to which there are not known exceptions ; should any 

 exception be met with we should at once doubt the 

 sufficiency of such theories. In cases such as Mr. 

 Balfour has discussed — the problems of metaphysics 

 and of belief — experiment and obser\-ation are impos- 

 sible : we can only resort to speculative reasoning ; our 

 belief, if we have one, is necessarily founded upon 

 intangibilities and desires. 



There was a dror to which I found no key : 

 There was a veil past which I could not iee ; 



Some little talk awhile of Me auft Thee 

 There seemed— and then no more of Thee and Me. 



The awful problem before us at the present time 

 is to decide which direction we will take, to what 

 extent and in what way we have the right to teach 

 things which transcend our knowledge ; the way in 

 which truth lies may be clear to some of us but can 

 never be to the majority. Those who wrap up such 

 matters in a tangle of words are not helpful, to say 

 the least. However mellifluous the terms of Berg- 

 sonian philosophy may be, they do not bear analysis 

 when the attempt is made to interpret them; their 

 effect is merely sensuous, like that of cathedral music. 



But in order that she may lead, science must herself 

 set an unimpeachable example — far too much that is 

 now taught under the guise of science is pure dogma ; 

 in fact, the philosophy of the schools is mostly dogma. 

 The true legal habit of mind is insufficiently cultivated 

 and but rarelv developed even among scientific 

 workers — our logic is too often imperfect. In 

 science, as in ordinan.- life, party politics run high 

 and scientific workers are usually, for the time being, 

 party politicians. We are too often crass specialists, 

 always very human : indeed, whatever the lines along 

 which evolution has taken place, they cannot well 

 have been such as to favour in any considerable^ degree 

 the development of the proclivities which distinguish 

 the scientific inquirer : time after time, doubtless, he 

 has been knocked on the head. 



The difficulties under which science labours in our 

 schools are partly internal, partly external. Tradition 

 and the t>-pe of' mind of the average teacher favour 



