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THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1914. 



VITALISTIC BIOLOGY. 



(i) The History and Theory of Vitalism. By 

 Prof. H. Driesch. Authorised translation by 

 C. K. Ogden. Pp. viii + 239. (London : Mac- 

 millan and Co., Ltd., 1914.) Price 55. net. 

 (2) The Philosophy of Biology. By Dr. J. John- 

 stone. Pp. XV + 391. (Cambridge University 

 Press, 1914.) Price gs. net. 

 (i) T T is a somewhat melancholy reflection for 

 1 those who had the pleasure of listening 

 to Prof. Driesch 's brilliant lectures on "Mtalism " 

 at King's College last year, that owing to the 

 outbreak of the present war Prof. Driesch may be 

 at this moment engaged in armed conflict with 

 some of his then hearers. Few German men of 

 science had more friends in England than Prof. 

 Driesch, and few had a warmer appreciation of 

 England. One of his very earliest pieces of work 

 was accomplished in the marine station at Ply- 

 mouth. 



In the volume before us Prof. Driesch is deal- 

 ing not with facts but with the history of the idea 

 of vitalism, the idea, that is to say, that there is 

 at work in organic beings some agency not to 

 be discovered in inorganic things, and that the 

 peculiarities of living matter are not to be ex- 

 plained by its physical and chemical structure, but 

 by an organising " something " within, which con- 

 tinually modifies this structure in order to achieve 

 an "end." . Beginning with Aristotle, Driesch re- 

 counts for us the views of a series of vitalistic 

 naturalists and philosophers ending and culminat- 

 ing in himself. It would indeed be a perilous 

 undertaking were we to attempt to criticise in 

 detail the account which he gives of the earlier 

 vitalists, among whom are included, not only 

 Aristotle and many of the older naturalists, but 

 Kant, Lotze, and Schopenhauer, and it would 

 have but little interest for the readers of Nature. 

 The scientific man, as distinguished from the 

 metaphysician, takes only a minor interest in the 

 views of €arly naturalists, who dezdt with imper- 

 fectly known and ill-understood data, and still 

 less in those of dealers in abstractions like Kant. 

 Prof. Driesch, with a daring which we can only 

 humbly admire, endeavours to make clear what 

 Kant really meant. Perhaps we may remind him 

 that another German philosopher, Paulsen, has 

 defied anyone to find a rational meaning in a good 

 deal of what Kant wrote, adding that it is only 

 to be explained psychologically as due to the pull 

 of tendencies which dragged Kant's mind now in 

 lie direction, now in another. 

 The book concludes, as we have intimated, with 



an account of Driesch 's own views, but as these 

 are pretty faithfully reproduced in the second 

 volume which we notice in this review, we may 

 defer criticism of them. We should like, howr 

 ever, to protest in the strongest manner against 

 the scornful way in which Driesch refers to 

 Darwin. " Darwin — left the question of varia- 

 bility open, a course which reduced his doctrine 

 to the self-evident prop>osition that what was not 

 capable of existence could not exist." "Darwin- 

 isnrj — explained how, by throwing stones, one 

 could build houses of typical style." 



When we contrast the work of Darwin, based 

 on a life-time of study and on the broadest pos- 

 sible survey of the fields of zoology and botany, 

 with that of his critic, which may be described as 

 an inverted pyramid based on myopic concentra- 

 tion on a few facts of development, and con- 

 trast, further, the influence which the theories of 

 the two men have had on contemporary thought, 

 we are forced to the conclusion that to Prof. 

 Driesch, as to many of his countrymen, the Lord 

 hath denied a sense of humour. 



Darwin, taking for granted the known pecu- 

 liarities of living beings seen every day around us, 

 and pointing out the result of the impact of the 

 known forces of the environment on these jjecu- 

 liarities, sought to prove that a world something 

 like the present one must result from purely 

 natural causes ; he is neither mechanist nor 

 vitalist. Driesch at the close of his book tells 

 that he supposes phylogeny to be a " supra-per- 

 sonal evolution." Which view, we may ask, is 

 more helpful as a working hypothesis? 



(2) Mr. Johnstone's book may be perhaps 

 described as a combination of Driesch and Berg- 

 son. Its object is to support vitalism, and to 

 combat the mechanistic view of life. Mr. John- 

 stone, who is a biologist distinguished for his 

 researches into problems of marine biology, has 

 the merit of putting his case in clear, well-written 

 language, and although he has to deal with 

 philosophical problems he avoids philosophical 

 technical terms as much as possible, so that the 

 ordinary reader has little difficulty in following 

 him. On the principle, apparently, that any stick 

 is good enough to beat a dog with, Mr, Johnstone 

 employs arguments of totally diff^erent, and some- 

 what incompatible, kinds to enforce his jxjsition. 

 He begins with a chapter entitled "The Concep- 

 tual World," which is a statement of the ideal- 

 istic position, and really assists him not at all. 

 For this position merely affirms the fact, obvious 

 on reflection, that experience as / receive it im- 

 plies at least an / who perceives it, and who is as 

 real as the experience. The logical outcome of 

 this, as Driesch has phrased it, is, "The world is 



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