January 31, 1901] 



NATURE 



321 



We cannot here discuss the detailed arguments of the 

 book, but the author's standing requires that we should 

 at least indicate the general trend. The chapters run : — 

 the nature of the problem, our bodily frame, our life, our 

 embryonic development, the history of our species, the 

 nature of the soul, psychic gradations, the embryology of 

 the soul, the phylogeny of the soul, consciousness, the 

 immortality of the soul, the law of substance, the evolu- 

 tion of the world, the unity of nature, God and the world, 

 knowledge and belief, science and Christianity, our 

 monistic religion, our monistic ethics, solution of the 

 world-problems. It is from the last chapter that we 

 select a quotation which sums up the author's position. 



" Towering above all the achievements and discoveries 

 of the century, we have the great", comprehensive 'law 

 of substance,' the fundamental law of the constancy of 

 matter and force. The fact that substance is everywhere 

 subject to eternal movement and transformation gives it 

 the character also of the universal law of evolution. As 

 ihis supreme law has been firmly established, and all 

 others are subordinate to it, we arrive at a conviction of 

 the universal unity of nature and the eternal validity of 

 its laws. From the gloomy problem of substance we 

 have evolved the clear law of substance. The monism 

 of the cosmos which we establish thereon proclaims the 

 absolute dominion of 'the great eternal iron laws' 

 throughout the universe. It thus shatters, at the same 

 time, the three central dogmas of the dualistic philo- 

 sophy — the personality of God, the immortality of the 

 soul, and the freedom of the will " (pp. 388-389). 



There seems some need here for a criticism of 

 categories, but we make only two remarks. 



Since, as Haeckel says, " no scientist ever asks 

 seriously of the 'purpose' of any single phenomenon," 

 smce, in other words, science does not discuss the 

 meaning or significance of experience, it- is obviously as 

 a philosopher that he seeks to demolish the ancient 

 beliefs, and there will no doubt be found those who, 

 while bowing to his scientific authority, will prefer Kant 

 or some other as their philosophical guide. 



Secondly, to scientific minds who regard laws of nature 

 as merely conceptual formulas summing-up certain se- 

 •quences of experience, it may seem that to replace " a 

 deliberate architect and ruler of the world" by "the 

 eternal iron laws of nature " is to be guilty of an anthro- 

 pomorphism precisely analogous to those on which the 

 •illustrious author pours contempt. Altogether, this en- 

 deavour to give monism to the multitude seems to us to 

 bear an unfortunate resemblance to the device of trying 

 to pay debts by means of an overdraft without first facing 

 the question of general solvency. 



When we say that we do not find in this volume any 

 solution of any of the riddles of the universe, we mean 

 ,no particular reproach against the author, for he is a 

 scientific worker, and we do not think that it is within 

 the scope of science to solve " Weltrathsel." In other 

 words, we adhere to the position that " all science is 

 •description, not explanation." If the phenomena which 

 we label gravitational or evolutionary were once riddles, 

 they remain so, although Newton and Darwin have 

 given us what Karl Pearson calls thought-economising 

 •devices for dealing with them. 



The book falls short of its high ambition because it is 

 ■neither scientific enough nor philosophical enough to 

 win conviction. It is not scientific enough, since mere 

 NO. 1631, VOL. 63] 



formulae (endowed with "eternal validity") stalk through 

 the book, doing this and doing that, like the Greek 

 gods come back again, and since when the well-known 

 difiiculties raised by the " big lifts " in the great process 

 of Becoming have to be faced, the author has no new 

 light to offer (we are not forgetful of his illumining 

 work in the past), but simply rubs his lamp and summons 

 the two genii, Substance and Evolution, and the work is 

 done. In plain fact, Evolution travels through the book 

 like a creator in disguise. There is many a quaint 

 illustration of the metaphysician unconscious of himself, 

 as when the author, after referring the doctrine of the 

 conservation of matter and energy (his " law of sub- 

 stance" or "fundamental cosmic law") to Lavoisier, 

 Helmholtz and others, says : " In the ultimate analysis 

 it is found to be a necessary consequence of the principle 

 of causality." 



Nor does the book seem to us philosophical enough ; 

 it does not even show an appreciation of the philosopher's 

 problems. In confessing that we are as far from under- 

 standing " the innermost character of nature," " the 

 problem of substance" as Anaximander and Empedocles 

 were 2400 years ago, Haeckel says :■ — 



" We do not know the ' thing-in-itself ' that lies behind 

 these knowable phenomena. But why trouble about this 

 enigmatic ' thing-in-itself when we have no means of 

 investigating it, when we dp not even clearly know 

 whether it exists or not." 



Now many who agree with this assumption of the 

 futility of the " things-in-itself " may at the same 

 time doubt whether the philosopher troubles himself 

 much about it either, whether this is not mere bluff- 

 ing in presence of the fact that our " routine of 

 perceptions "zj' a problem (not to be ignored, even 

 if insoluble), whether transcendental formulas have no 

 utility because scientific formulae {e.g. atomic theories, 

 ether theories, &c.) seem to many minds to have much, 

 and whether the position indicated is consistent with the 

 energy expended throughout the book in "shattering" 

 Christian and other philosophies of life which have 

 obviously no standing if from the outset the problem of 

 the significance and meaning of experience is ruled out 

 of court as an irrelevancy. One feels that the author 

 has not quite learned the " rules of the game " when he 

 is satisfied with saying in answer to idealistic monism :— 



" In my opinion the existence of ether is as certain as 

 that of ponderable matter — as certain as my own 

 existence, as I reflect and write on it. As we assure our- 

 selves of the existence of ponderable matter by its mass 

 and weight, by chemical and mechanical experiments, 

 so we prove that of ether by the experiences and experi- 

 ments of optics and electricity." 



But this is just Dr. Johnson and Bishop Berkeley over 

 again, and no idealist will so much as turn a hair. 



SCHMEIUS TEXT-BOOK OF ZOOLOGY. 

 A Text-book of Zoology; treated front a Biological 

 Standpoint. By Dr. O. Schmeil. Translated by 

 R. Rosenstock, and edited by J. T. Cunningham. 

 Parts ii. and iii. Reptiles to Invertebrates. (London: 

 A. and C. Black, 1900.) 



THE first part of this school text-book was noticed in 

 our issue of August 23, 1900, and with the publica- 

 tion of Part iii. the work is completed. Considering . 



