A Table fliewing what is contained in the feverall 



Chapters and Sections in this fecond Ttcatife, 



Concerning MANS SO U L. 



CHAP. I. 



He Prcfjce. Of fimple Ap- 

 prehenfions. 



I . What is A right apprehenjien of 



A thing. 

 2. The very thing it ft If if truly 



in his under ft anding^who right- 



ly arehendfth it. 



The apprehenjion of things co- 



8. 



ld. -A mult it tide of things may be 

 united in mans under/landing 

 without being mingled or con- 

 founded together. 



II. Of abftrafttd and concrete 



terms. 



nting unto us by our fenfes, are 

 refolvable into other more Jim - 

 fie apprehenfions. 



4. The apprehenfion 'of a Being is 

 the mo ft Jimple and Bafis of all, 

 the reft. 



5. The apprehetijiott ef a thing if I 

 in next degree to that of Being, 

 and it is the Bafis of all the fub- 2 

 fequent ones. 



6.The a^prehenjion of things k^nown \ 

 to w by our fen fe s doth conjift in 3 

 certain rcfpefts betwixt two 

 things. 



j. Refpctt or relation hath not re- 

 ally any form all being, but onely 

 in the appreheafiox-of man. 

 That Exigence or Being is the 

 proper affection of man: and that 

 mam foul it a comparingpower. 

 A thing by coming into the un- 



12. Of univerfa.ll Kotiovf. 



i 5. Of apprehending a multitude 



under one notion. 

 14. The p ower of the understanding 



rencheth as farre as the extent 

 of Being. 



CHAP. II. 

 Of Thinking and Knowing. 



How a judgement is made by 

 the understanding. 



7 hat two or more apprehettfions 

 are identified in the foul by u- 

 ntting them inthefteck. 0f being 



How the notions of a fubftan- 

 tive and an adieclive.are united. 

 in the foul by the common flock, 

 of Being. 



That a fettled judgement be- 

 cometh a part of our foul. 

 How the foul cometh to deem or 

 fettle a judgement. 



How opinion if begotten in the 

 underftandina. 



derftanding of man } lofeth no- , 7. How faith if begotten in the 

 thing of its own peculiar nature. I uxdcrftanding. 



* * * a 8. Why 



