A TrfAtife of B O D I E S. Chap. r. 



firft and primary affection; and that which maketh the things: 

 we treat of, be what we intend to fignifie by the name of Body. 

 But becaufe there is a great variety of apprehensions framed 

 by learned men of the nature of Quantity (though indeed no- 

 ' s thing can be more plain and fimplc then it is in it felf) I con- 

 IC ceive it will not beamifle, before we enter into the explication 

 of it, to confider how the myfterie of dilcourfing and exprefsing 

 the mindsof our thoughts to one another by \\ordi ( a prerogative belong- 

 ing onely to man ) is ordered and governed among us ; that Ib 

 we may avoid thofe rocks , which many and for the moft 

 part, fuch as think they fpin the fineft thrids, do fuffer ftiip- 

 \vraek againft in their fubrileft-difcourfes. The moft dangerous 

 of all which, affuredly is when they confound the true and reall 

 natures of things, with the conceptions they frame of them in 

 their own minds. By which fundamental! mifcarriage of their 

 reafoning, they fall into great errours and abfurdities : and 

 whatfbever they build upon fo ruinous a foundation, proveth 

 but ulelefle cobwebs or prodigious Chymeias. It is true, words 

 fervc to exprefle things; but if you obferve the matter well, you 

 , will perceive they do fo, onely according to the pictures we 

 make of them in our own thoughts, and not according as the 

 things are in their proper natures. Which is very reafonable ic 

 fliould be fo, fincc the foul, thatgiveth the names, hath nothing 

 of the things in her but thefe notions : and knoweth not the 

 thing? otherwife then by thcfe notions ; and therefore cannot 

 give other names but fuch as muft fignifTe the things by me* 

 diacion of thefe notions. In the things, all that belongeth un- 

 to them is comprised under one entire Entity : b:it in us, there 

 areframed as many fererall diftincl: formall conceptions, af 

 that one thing fhcweth it felf unto us with different faces. 

 Every one of which conceptions fecmeth to have for its ob- 

 ject adiftinft thing, becaufe the conception it felf is as much fe- 

 vered and diftinguifLed from another conception or image, 

 arifing out of the yery fame thing that begot this, as it can be 

 from any image painted in the underftanding by art abfolutely 

 other thing. 



^. It will not be amiflc to illuftrate this matter by fome farni- 



Thefiift errour liar example. Imagine I have an apple in my hand : the fame 

 fem hcncV' fC fruit worketli different effetts upon my fcverall fenfes : rny eye 



ttllcth 



