Chap", i. esfrreMtfeofBODlES. 



the Eflcnce and to give Exfiftence unto corporeall individuals: 

 and Co each Idea was embodied in every individuall of its 

 /pec-ies. Unto which opinion ( and upon th fame grounds). 

 Averroes did lean, in the particular of mens fouls. Likewilc 

 Scotus finding in his undemanding an univerfall notion 

 Springing from the impreflion that individuals make in it,will 

 have alike univerfall in the thing it (elf, fo determining uni- 

 verfals ( to ufe his own language and terms) to be a parte rti; 

 and cxpreflfing the diftin&ion they have from the reft of the 

 thing, by the terms o{attttformaliter,fed non remitter and 

 thereby maketh every individuall comprife an univerfall fub- 

 fiftent nature in it. Which inconvenience other modern Phi- 

 lofbphers fceking to avoid, will not allow thefc univerfalls a 

 reall and a<5hiall fubfiiknce; but will lend them onely a fiffa- 

 tious Being, fo making them as they call them Entia rationis. 

 Bat herein again they (after themfeives to be carried down the 

 ftream before they are aware by the undcrftanding fwhich is 

 apt to pin upon the objects, the notions it findeth within it 

 felf resulting i'rom them) and do confider an unity in the 

 things which indeed is onely in the underftanding. 



Therefore one of our greateft cares in the guidance of our y. 

 dilcourfe, and a continuall and fedulous caution therein,ought Great care t 

 tobeufed in this particular, where every errour is a funda- void^hTerro 

 mentall one, and leadeth into inextricable labyrinths, and hich may > 

 where that which is all our level to keep us upright and even nerof undcr- 

 C our underftanding) is fo apt, by reafon of its own nature 

 and manner of operation, to make us flide into miftaking and 

 crrour. And to fumme up in fhort what this difcourfe aimcth 

 at, we muft narrowly take heed , left reflecting upon the no- 

 tions we have in our mind, we afterwards pin thofe aiery /- 

 perttru&ures upon the materiall things themfeives, that be- 

 got them; or frame a new conception of the nature of any 

 thing by the negotiation of our underftanding, upon thofc 

 imprefTions which it felf maketh in us : whereas we fhould 

 acquiefce and be content with that naturall and plain notion, 

 which fpringeth immediately and primarily from the thing it 

 felfrwhich when we do not,the more we fecm to cxcell in fub- 

 tilty, the further we go from reality and truth;hkean arrow, 

 which being wrong levelled at hand,falleth widcft when (hot 

 in the ftrongcft bow. A 3 Now 



