Chip. 6. 



Entities or Things , diftinft from the bodies they accom- 

 pany : and yet, they deny them a fubfiftencc or felf-bcing; 

 faying they do but inhere in their fubjecl: , which fupport- 

 erh them ; or which is all one, that their being is a dependence 

 of a fubjecl. 



If they will reflect upon what they fay , and make their 

 thoughts and their words agree j they will find, that the firft 

 part of their defcription maketh them compleat fubftances; 

 which afterwards, in words they flatly deny : and it is impof- 

 fible to reconcile thefe two meanings. A reall Entity or thing 

 inuft ncceffarily have an Exigence or Being of its own: which 

 they allow them. And whatfoever hath fo , becometh a fub- 

 ftance : for it fubfifteth by its own Exigence; or ( to fay plain- 

 er) is what it is by its own Being; and needcth not the exi- 

 ftence of another thing to give it a Being. And then prefcntly 

 to fay that it doth not fubfiit of it felf ; or that it requireth the 

 fubfifteuce of a fubftancc, to make it Be-, is a pure contradii- 

 on to the former. 



This arifcth from a wrong notion they make to themfclvcs 

 of* fubftance, exiftencc and {uwiftcnce : and from their not con- 

 fulting fufficiently with their own thoughts, as well as ftudy- 

 ing in books. They meet there with different terms; by help of 

 which, they keep themfelves from contradiction in words, but 

 not in effect. If the terms were rightly conceived, and notions 

 duely fitted to therm f which requireth deep meditation upon 

 the things themfelyes, and a brain free from all inclination to 

 fiding, or aflfe^ion to opinions for the authonrs fakes, before 

 they be well underftocd and examined ) many ofthofe dilutes 

 would fall to the ground , in which oftentimes both fides lofe 

 themfclves, and the qucftion, before they come to an end. They 

 are in the dark before they are aware : and then they make 

 a noife, onely with terms ; which like too heavy weapons that 

 they cannot weild, do carry their ftrokes beyond their aim. 

 Of fuch nature arc the qualites and moods, that feme modern 

 Philofophers have fo fubtilifed upon. And in that fcnfe, we ut- 

 terly dcnie them : which being a qucftion appertaining to Me- 

 taphyficks, it belongeth not to our prefent purpole to ing*gc 

 our fclves further in it. 



But, as they are ordinarily underftood in common conver- a. 



D fation, 



