$o 'JTrtttiJi tf/ BO DIES. Chap.rf, 



T K W A at h fcnfc f at ' 0n> wc a ^ ow them. And our work is but to explicate 

 dothadmiToir and (hew the particulars in retail, of what men naturally 

 qualities. /peak in grofTe. For that fcrveth their turn to know what 

 one another meaneth : whereas, it belongeth onely unto a Phi- 

 lofopher , to examine the caufes of things . Others arc con- 

 tent with the effects : and they fpeak truly and properly when 

 they defignc them. As for example: when they fay that fire 

 burneth by a quality of heat that it hath , or that a deyc is 

 fquare by the quality of a cubicail figure that is in it ; they 

 fpeak as they Should do. But if others will take occafion 

 upon this , to let their understanding give a Being unto 

 theft qualities , diflinS from the fubftaraces in which they 

 conceive them; there they rniiTe. If we confider the fame man 

 hungry/or thirfty* or weary, or fleepy, or ftanding, or fitting; 

 the undcrftanding prefemly maketh within it felf reall 

 things of fleep, hunger, thirft, wearinefTe , ftanding, and 

 fitting. Whereas indeed , they are but different affections or 

 Situations of the fame body. And therefore we muft beware of 

 applying thefe notions of our mind, to the things as they are 

 in therafclvcs : as much as we muft, of conceiving thofe 

 parts to be actually in a continued quantity , whereof we can 

 frame actually diftinct notions in our understanding. But as, 

 when ordinary men fay, that a yard ccntaineth three feet; 

 it is true in this fcnfe, that three feet may be made of it; but 

 that whiles it is a yard , it is but one quantity or thing, and 

 not three things : fo, they who make profcflion to examine ri- 

 goroufly the meaning of words , muft explicate in what fenfc 

 it is true that heat and figure (our former examples ) are qua- 

 lities : for fi:ch we grant them to be ; and in no wife do con- 

 tradict the common manner of fpeech; which entereth not into 

 the Philofophicall nature of them. 



We fay then, that qualities aic nothing elfc but the proprie- 

 ties, or particularities wherein one thing differeth from another. 

 And therefore Logicians, call fubftamiall tlifferencies, fubfian- 

 tiall qualities : and lay, they arc predicated in QH*IC quid. But 

 the Predicament of Quality is ordered by Ariftotle to con- 

 clude in it thofe differences of things, wh'ch are neither fub- 

 fhntiall nor quantitative, and yet are intrinfecall and abfblute. 

 And & that which the undcrfttndingcallech heat, and maketh a 



notion 



