1 76* A Treat! ft of BODIES. Chap. 1 6. 



of aflivitity being leflcr then the fires, they cannot cool fo farre 

 ofivas the others can heat : but where they do arrive, they give 

 their proportion of cold, in the very midft of the others army of 

 fiery ato:ncs, notwithstanding their multitude and violence. 



According to which do&rine, oureountrymin Suiflfeth his 

 argument, that in the fchools is held infoluble,hath not fo much 

 as any femblance of the lealt difficultyrfor it is evident that fuch 

 acomes of fire and of water as we determine heat and cold to be, 

 miy paflfc and croud by one another into the fubje^s they arc 

 Tent unto by divers little ftreams without hindering one another 

 (as we have declared of aire and light) and each of them be re- 

 ceived in their own nature and temper by the fame fubjcft ; 

 though fenle can judge onely according to which of them is pre- 

 dominant, and according to the proportion ofits fuperiority. 



Upon which occafion we cannot chiife but note, how the do- 

 <5hine of qualities is not onely unable to gire account of the or- 

 dinary and plain effects of nature ; but allb ufeth to end in cleer 

 impoflibilities and contradictions if it be driven far:as this argu- 

 ment of SuiflTeth fheweth, and many others of the like nature. 

 (,. A fourth pofition among Philofophers is, that fdme notions 



Why ibmc no- do admit the denominations of Intension and Remiffion, but that 

 on\c(u>najid others do not.The reafon ofwhich we flhall clearly fee, if we but 

 rettiffion > and confider how thefe termes tfintenfionAndremiflio*, do but ex- 

 prcfTe more r leffe, ofthe thing that is faid to be intended or re- 

 mitted :for the nature of more and lefle doth imply a latitude 

 and divisibility ; and therefore cannot agree with the nature of 

 fuch things as confift in an indivifible being. As for example to 

 be a whole or to be an cqutll, cannot be fometrmes more, fome- 

 timcs lefTe; for they confift in fuch a rigorous indivifible being, 

 that if the leaft part imaginable be wanting it is no longer a 

 whole, and if there be the leaft excefle between two things, they 

 are no longer equall, but are in fome other proportion then of 

 equality in regard of one another. 



And hence it is that Ariftotle teacheth us that fnbft*ncc and 

 the fpecies of Quantity, do not admit of intension and remiffi- 

 on;but that quality doth. For firft in fttbftaxce, we know that 

 the fignification ofthis word is,that w ch maketh a thing be what 

 it is, as is evident by our giving it for an anfwerto the quefti- 

 on what a thing is. And therefore^ if there were any divifibility 



i. 



