OF MANS SOULE. Chap. I. j 



apprehenfion, I difcover three kinds of particular apprehenfions, 

 every one mere fimple and refined then the other. The higheft of 

 them,and the foundation upon which the others arc built, is the 

 notion of Being : which is of Co high, and of fo abftrtfted a na- 

 ture, that we cannot retrivc words toeypreffein what manner 

 we conceive it ; but arcfainc to content our felvcs with the out- 

 ward found of a word, by which, without dcfcribing our own e, 

 we ftir up the like conception in another: and that is the word 

 Is by which we intimate the Being of the thing we apprehend. 

 And this notion can be in our mind, without inferring any other ; 

 and therefore is thefimpleft of all others : whicruot nec.flity, 

 muft imply it, and cannot be without it, although it can be with- 

 out them. 



Our next apprehenfion is of that which hath Being : and is ex- 5 . 

 prefled by the word Thing. This is not fo fimple as the former;for The aprchcn- 



it is compofcd of it, and of what receiveth it ; of Being t and of . 

 H>ht bath Bein? .-yet it is much fimpler then the next degree of ' s 



L r i i r i 'it i 5 & ICC lo ln<lt * 



apprehenlions, which is cauied in our mind by the great variety Being, and it is 

 of things,that come thither through ourfenfes; and can be con- the Bj/?5 of all 

 ceived without any of them, though none of them can without the fre 

 it; for I can have in me the motion of a f/Mw^abftrafting from all 01 

 accidents whatfoever; as of magnitudcjof figure, of colour, of re- 

 femblance, or the like : but I cannot conceive it to be long, or 

 fharp, or blew, &c. without allowing it firft to be fomevtItAt or 

 [0metbingj\ux. is in fuch fort affecTred : fo that the apprehenfion of 

 a tk'mgjx of that which hath Being, is the Bafiscf all our other 

 futf.quent apprehenfions; as the apprehenfion of Being, is the 

 bafis of the apprehenfion of a thing : for had it not Being y it were 

 not a thi*g and were it not a thing , it could not be faid to be a 

 lo g thing or ajktrp thing ; nor indeed that it were long or fiarp: 

 for to be I0doth include Being ; and what hath Beingjs a Thing. 

 And thus we may obferve,how the bulke of our apprehenfions is 

 compofed of fomething adventitious, andoffomething former- 

 ly within us, which is of a very different nature from all the o- 

 thers j and yet fo fitted and neceifary to them, that none of them kno wn c w u$ 

 can be without it, although it not oncly can be,but is beft eoncei- by our fenfev, 

 ved without relation to any ef them. doch cn fift i 



We (kail cafily difcerne,fof how different t ftraine this concep- 

 tion of J^m^jisrrom all other$,that enter by our fcnfes, (as from t 05. 



A a a 3 the 



