OF MANS SOULE. Chap. I. 7 



But a rejpe tt in its owne niture, is a kind of rye, comparifon , ten- 

 ding, or order, of one of thofe things to another;and is no where to 

 be found in itsformall fubfiftence,but in the apprehenfion of man : 

 and therefore it cannot be defcribed by any fimilitude , nor be ex- 

 prefled by any means,but(like Being Jby the found of a word,which 

 we are agreed upon to ftirre up in us fuch a notion; for in the things, 

 it is not iuch a thing as our notion of it is: (which notion is tha% 

 which weufetoexprefle by Proportions and con/un<5tions , and 

 which Ariftotle and Logicians exprefle in common , by the word 

 #&< t oTa4) and therefore there is nothing out of us, to paint it by : 

 as Icould doc-whitf or fi]H<ire,oi: round , or the like; becaufethcfe 

 have a beirg in the things that are white, or fquarc, &c. and confe- 

 quently they may be exprefled by others of the like nature . but the 

 Hkentftc that one white hath to another, or the resell that either of 

 them hath to mans imagination's only in Manjwho by comparing 

 them, giveth birth to the nature and Being ofrejpeEt. 



Out of'thisdifcourfe, we may colled* two finguhritics of man; 8. 



which will much import us, to take particular notice of: the Thatx//?//c 

 one is, that 2? or a *&/# (the fermall notion ofwhichismeer- or betn *> isthc 

 ly Bfiff?) is the proper affjdion of man ; for every particular thing P r P^ r a Teft 



. / , , _ . N 9. on of man: 



js in him , by being (as I may fay) graned upon the Itocke of an( i th at mans 

 Exigence or of Being : and accordingly we fee , that whatfoever foule is a com- 

 wefpeakof , we iay it Isfomething: and whatfoever wee cen- p^' n g power, 

 ceivc'jwegiveitthenatureofa^w^jaswhen we have fatd, the 

 wall is white, we frame vrhiteneffc as a thing : fo did we immed'.- 

 att-ly before fpcaking of Rejpett, we took rtjpeft as it were a thing 

 and enquired, where it is : lo that it is evident, that all the negotia- 

 tion of our underihnding, tradtth in all that is apprehended by if, 

 as i" they were things. 



The other fingularity we may obferveinman is, that he is acow- 

 f tiring power -, for all his particular knowledges, are nothing elfe 

 but rejpeth or comparifons betweene particular things : as for 

 example, for a man to know heat, or cold, &c. is to know, ,9' 

 what effects fire or water, &c. can worke upon fuch or fuch A .& ty 



, ,. ccmmme into 



bod ^S. t!i . u: , d crftan- 



Out of the firft of thefe proprieties it followeth, that what afLft- dh.g o. man, 

 cthaman,ormakethi rpreffion uptdn his understanding, doth not lopiethnp- 

 ethereby loofe its owne peculiar nature , nor is it modified to jj ; "?. 

 the recipient; the contrary of which, wee fee happeiieth per- nature^' 



Aaa 4 petually 



