I4 ATREATISE 



THE SECOND CHAPTER. 

 Of Thinking find Knowing. 



j. TTAving thus declared the nature of fingle apprehenfions, the 

 How a judge- JTl method we have prefcribed our ftlves, requireth that wee 

 mem is made examine in the next place, what effed the joyning of them to- 

 by the under- ' g e ther may have ; for from thence doe fpring Enunciations or 

 lutgements j which are in the next rank after fitnple apprehen- 

 fions, and are the materials whereof difcourfes are immediately 

 framed : as when of the two apprehenfions of knife and of 

 fiarf>f,we may make this enunciation, the knife itfiarfe. In this 

 enquiry the firft thing that occurreth unto us, is to confider, in 

 what manner two differing fitnple apprehenfions, doe become 

 /oyned to one another : and we (kail find, that they are not tyed 

 together like feverall diftind things in one bundle, or like ftones 

 in a heap, where all that are comprifed under one multitude, are 

 yet circumfcribcd within their owne limits, and thereby are 

 wholly diftinguifhed from each other j but that they are as it 

 were grafted upon one ftock; which being common to botfej 

 giveth the fame life to both j tndfobecomming one with each 

 of them, maketh them be one and the fame thing between them- 

 felvcs. And this is the notion of Being or Exigence, in thefub- 

 jed wefpeakof: which (as we have already fhewed) is the 

 Bafis and foundation of all other apprehenfions ; and by being 

 common and indifferent to all, is the fitteft glew to unite thofe 

 that are capable of fuch con junction ; and accordingly we lee, 

 that moft of our fpeech runneth upon this ftraine, that this it that, 

 ex doth that, (which is as much to fay as u doing that) thitSe- 

 cratcsisaman, or that Socrates runneth, (which fignifyeth, u 

 running) and the like : and fince our fpeech proceedcth from the 

 conceptions of our mind ; it is clearc, that as the words which 

 exprefle Being or Exiftenct, doe joync together the other words 

 that weufe, (or at lcaft,thegreateft part ofthcm) fo like wife in 

 our mind the apprehenfion of Be /,is the glew that jayneth our 

 apprehenfions correfponding to our words. 



All which will appcare to be faid with great reafon , if we re- 

 flccT; upon it ; for when diverfe apprehenfions may be thus joy ned 

 together, it is indeed, that one and the fame thing aftlding us fe- 



tertli 



