OF MANS SOULE. Chap. II. 



vcrall wayes and under different confiderations ; thofe indifferent 

 crpreflions doe beget different apprchenfions in us : and io, till 

 we examine the matter, every one of them fcemeth to be a dif- 

 ferent thing : but when we trace thcfc ftreames up to the foun- 

 taine head, we difccrne that all of them doe belong to one and the 

 fame thing ; and that by being in that thing, they are among 

 themfelvesthe very fame thing,howeverthey affect us varioufly; 

 and therefore may truly be faid to be one,is indeed they are : and 

 confcquently,nothing is more fit to joyne together in our mind 

 thofc different apprehenfions, then the apprehcnfion of Being 

 which maketh us apprehend as one thing, thofe notions which 

 really, and in the thing it felfe, arc bat one, as we have often 

 touched, both in the former Treatife, and lately in this : for this 

 is the way tojoyne things in the mind intelligently, and ac- 

 cording to the proper nature of the mind; which receiving im- 

 prcfiior.s from things exiftent, ought to confider thole imprefli- 

 ons as they flow from the very things, and not as they are in the 

 mind it felfe ; and by mediation of thofe impreffions, mutt take a 

 furvey of the things thcrnfelves ; and not ftay at the intellectuall 

 imprefiions they make in her : and confequently, muft appre- 

 hend thofe things to be one in them felves, (although in us they 

 be not fo) according to the courfe of our onginall and legitimate 

 apprehsnfions of things ; which is, as they are exiftent ; that is, 

 as they are in their owne nature, and in thcmfelvcs; and not ac- 

 cording to the difcourfes and fccondary apprehe.nfions we make 

 of the images we find of them in our mind. Andthus thingsare 

 rightly joy ned by apprehenfion ; without caution in which par- 

 ticular, we (hall run into great errors in our difcourfe : for if we 

 be riot very cartfull herein, we are apt to miftake the ufe of the 

 impreflions we receive from things, and to ground our judge- 

 ments concerning them, according to what we find of them in 

 our mind, and nt according to what they areinthemfelves: 

 which two ie verall confederations, have quite different faces ; al- 

 though fit is true) thofe impreflions arc made by the things, and 

 are the onely meanes by which we may rightly judge of them ; 

 provided,that we confider them as they arc in the things,and not 

 as they are in us. 



Now this con junction of apprehenfions, by the mediation and 

 theglew of Bcigjs the moft natuull and fitting, not onely in 



regard 



