16 ATREATISE 



regard of the things, but even in regard ef us: for (as we have 

 already {hewed,) it is of all others the moft common and univcr- 

 fall, the raoft fimple or uncornpofed , and the moft naturall and 

 deepeft rooted in man .- out of all which,it is evident, that this u^ 

 nionof apprehenfions by the naeanes of Beings in truth an Iden- 

 tification of them : for Unity being a negation of multiplicity, 

 it folio weth, that what is one, is the fame : and this identificati- 

 on is truly and naturally exprefled by faying , that the oe u 

 the other. 



5. Butinfifting a little further upon thisconfideration, howdiffe- 



Howthc not!- rent apprehenfions become joyned and united together, by the 

 onsof a fub- notion of Being ; we may obferve that this happeneth, not oncly 

 adfcftivcarc" totw f in g^ oncs i ^ ut to more \ according as more then two, 

 united in'thc ma V belong unto one thing : and it may fo fall out, that more then 

 foule,by the one, be on either fide the common ligament. Thus when we fay, 

 common ftock A Man if A difcottrjive creature ; or a Rationattfott/e, u an immor- 

 ttllfftbfttnce, the two apprehenfions, of difcsurfeve, and of crea- 

 ture, are J oy ncd together in a third of Man, by the tye of one Be- 

 ing : and the two apprehenfions of ImmertaU, and of Sttbflance, 

 are united to the two others of &0*MMf jrnd f Soule, likcwife 

 by the ligament of one tingle Being. Evident it is then, that the 

 extremes are united by one Being : but how the two apprehen- 

 fions that are ranked together on the fame fide of the ligament 

 (as in our former examples, the apprehenfions okdifcottrjive and 

 of creature, of RationAlliu& of Sonle t ofJtnmortaMgLndQfSub* 

 pance) are betwcene themfelvcs joyned to one another, is not fo 

 eafietoexpreflc. It isclcere, that it is not done by ineere COH- 

 globation ; for we may obferve, that they doe belong, or arc ap- 

 prehended to belong, unto the fame thing ; and the very words 

 that exprcfle them, doe intimate fo much, by one of them being 

 an adjective ; which (heweth, they are not two things; for if 

 they were,they would require two fubftantives t defcribe them: 

 andconfequently it folio weth that one of them muft needs ap- 

 pertaine to the other : and fo both of them make but one'thing. 



And there is no doubt, but in the inward apprchenfion, there 

 is a variety correfpondent t the variety of words which expreflfe 

 it ; fince all variety of words that is made by intention, refulteth 

 out or fomefuch variety of apprehenfions. Therefore, fince the 

 words doe import, that the things have a dependence the one of 



the 



