as for example, if a man doe really deem'the weather to be cold, 

 or that his body rs diftempered, heputtefli on warmer cloathes, 

 or taketh phyfick; although peradventure he is iniftaken in both : 

 for his deeming them to b?fo,maketh him demeane himfelfc in 

 fuch fort, as if really they were Co. It is then evident, that by fuch 

 thinking or deeming, the nature conceived, is made an aftive prin- 

 ciple in us : unto which if we adde , that all the knowledge we 

 have of oar fouie, is no more, but that it is an aflive force in us , it 

 feemeth, that a thing, by having apprehenfions made of it in our 

 mind, and by being really thought to be agreeable to fuch appre- 

 henfions, becometh (as it were,) a part or affection of our foule, 

 and one thing with it. And this peradven'ure is the caufe ; wby 

 an underftanding man cannot eafily leave an opinion once deeply 

 rooted in him; hut doth wreftle andftrive againft all arguments 

 that would force him from it, as if apart of his foulc or unier- 

 ftanding were to be torne from him : in fuch manner as a bcaft 

 will cry and druggie to fave his body , from having any of his 

 'lirnbes disj jynted or pulled in peices. 



5' But this obferving the efrecl which followeth of ourdeem- 



^ ou e ingathingtobethusorfo.is not fufficient to informeus, what 

 deem or fettle it is that caufcth that deeming. We muft therefore take themat- 

 ic judgement, ter a little higher , and look into its immediate principles : and 

 there we fhall find , that it is the knowing of what we fay to be 

 true , and the aflurance , that the things are as wee deem them, 

 which quieteth our foule, and maketh it confent unto them , and 

 proceed to a&ion upon th at confent. Now this knowledge, is 

 the moft eminent part of deeming ; and of all our acquisitions, 

 is the moft inseparable from us ; and indeed in rigouf, it is ab- 

 folutely infeparable by direct mcanesj however peradventure 

 by indirect mtanes it maybe feparated. 



Let us then confider bow wee attaine unto it , and how 

 fometimes wee f aile in the purchafc of it ; and what degrees of 

 affurance or of probability there are betweenitandtrroor. To 

 this intent, wee may obferve that the greateft affurance , and 

 the moft eminent knowledge wee can have of any thing, is of 

 fuch Propositions, as in the Schoolesare called Identical! as 

 if onefhouldfay, lohn it lohn t or a mA* it a m*n : for the 

 truth of thcfe Propofitions is fo evident arid clcarc, as it is im- 

 pofliblc any man ihould doubt of them , if hce uoderftand what 



he 



