20 



A 



unquiet about it, and doubteth of the truth of it : in fpme Propo- 

 (itions, whiles he fcarcheth and enquiretK after the identification 

 of their extremes; pcradventure he difcerneth, that it is impoffi- 

 ble there Qiould be any between them; and then on the other fide, 

 he is fatistyed of the falfity of them : for if a Propofition be affir- 

 mative, it muft neceflarily be a falfe one, if there bee no Identifi- 

 cation between the extreames of it. 



By this difcourfe, wee have found two forts of Propofi- 

 tions, which beget knowledge in us. The one, where the 

 Identification of the extreames, is of itfelfe fo manifeft, that 

 when they are but explicated , it needeth no further proofe. 

 The other, where though in truth they be Identified, yet the 

 Identification appeareth not fo cleare, but thatforae difcourfe 

 is required to iatisfy the undeiftanding therein. Of the firft 

 kind , are fuch Propofitions as doe make one of the ext reams 

 the definition of the other whereof it is affirmed : as when wee 

 fay, a man is A reasonable creature-, which is fo evident, if we ut> 

 derftand what is mianed by a /Wrf,and what by x reafonable cren- 

 t*re,zs it netdeth no further proofe to make us know it: and 

 knowledge is begotten in us, not onfy by a perfect Identification 

 of the extreanieSj but as well by an imperfect one : as when what 

 is faid.ot another, is but part of its definition ; for example, if one 

 iliould ky,a man a creature, no body that knoweth him to bee 

 a ration*!! creature, (which is his compleat definition) could 

 doubt of his being a creature; becaufe that the being * creatnre t is 

 partly identifyed^q being a r*tion*.ll creature. In like manner, 

 this obvious evidence ef Identification, appeareth as well where 

 a compleat divifion of a thing is affirmed of the other extreame, 

 as where that affirmation is made by thetotall or pirtiall defini- 

 tion of it .- as when we lay, number is even or odde : an cnuatit- 

 tion is true or falle , and the like : where t beoiuie what is faid, 

 coEoprifeth the differences of the thing whereof it is faid, it 

 is plaine that of them muft ncedes bee that whereof wee 

 fpeak. 



Peradventure fome may expert, that we fliould give Identicall 

 Prppofitions (among others) for examples of this plaine evidence: 

 but becauie they bring no acquifiticn of new knowledge unto 

 the foulc, (the doing of which, and the reflecting upon the 

 manner 3 is the fcopc of this Chapter J I let them paile with- 

 out 



