OF MANS SOULE. Chap.II. 21 



out any further mention, upon this occafion having produced 

 them once before, onely to fhew by an undeniable example, what 

 it it is that makcth our loule confent unto an enunciation, and how 

 knowledge is begotten in her, that we might afterwards apply 

 the force of it to other Proportions. 



Let us therefore proceed to the fccond fort of Propofitions, 

 which require fome difcourfe,to prove the Identification of their 

 extreames. Nowthefcopeof fuch difcourfe is, by comparing 

 them unto fome other third thing, to (hew their Identification 

 bit ween themfclves; for it (hewttb, that each of them apart is 

 identified with that new fubjeft it bringeth in : and then ourun- 

 derftanding is fatisfied of their identity, and our foule is fecure of 

 that knowledge it thus acquireth, as well as it is of that which 

 refulteth out or thofc Propofitions, which beare their evidence in 

 their firft afpecl. 



This negotiation of the underftanding todifcover the truth of 

 Propofitions, when it is fomewhat hidden, (which we call dif- 

 courfe} as it is one of the chieftft and nobleft actions cf the foule, 

 io doth it challenge a very hcedfull infpc<5tion into it : and there- 

 fore we will allow it a peculiar Chapter by it felfe, to explicate 

 the nature and particularities of it. But this little wee now have 

 fdid concerning it, is furh'cient for this place; where all we ayme 

 at is to prove (and I conceive we have done it very fully ) that 

 when Identity between two or more things,prcfenteth it fclfe to 

 our underftandingjit maketh and forceth knowledge in our foule. 



Whence it is manifeft, that the fame power or ibule, which in 

 a fingle apprchenfion is poffcfled with the Entity or Vnitj of it , is 

 that very power or foul, which applycd to an #*c/*tt0,know- 

 ethordetmeth;fince0W;* is nothing elfe, but the apprehen- 

 ding of manifeft Identity in the extremes of a Proportion, or an 

 effect immediately conic quent out of it, in the foule that apply- 

 eth it felfe to apprehend that Identity. Which apprehcnfion is 

 made, either by the force of the extremes , applytd immediately 

 to one another, or elfe by the application of them to fome other 

 thing : which peradventure may require yet a further application 

 unto new apprehenfions, to make the Identity between the firft 6. 

 extremes appeare evidently. How opinion Is 



Now, as when Identity truly appeareth , it maketh evidence 

 to our underftanding , and begetteth affured knowledge in our d 



Bbb 3 foule; 



