A TREATISE 



of whatfoever elfc bclongeth to them all in general!, and to every 

 one of them in particular : bat our foule cannot be ftored or 

 fraught with any thing,by other meanes then by her aflent or dee- 

 ming : whereupon it rollo weth, that (he cannot have her perfe- 

 ction, untillher deemings or judgements be perfect j which is, 

 that they be agreeable unto the things in the world : when they, 

 are fo,then are they true. And this is the reafon why truth is the 

 aime and perfection of the foule. Now then, trutfc refiding onely 

 in the aflents and judgements of the foule,( which are the traffick 

 whereby (he enricheth her felfe with the reft of the world ) and 

 they peing framed by her difcerning an identity betweene two 

 ihings; which (he cxpreffeth by affirming one of them of the e- 

 ther; it followeth, that nothing can be true orfalfe, but where 

 there is a compofition of two extremes , made by the ones being 

 affirmed of the other ; which is done onely in Enuntiations or 

 judgements : whiles fingle apprehenfions aflent to nothing, and 

 therefore fettle no knowledge in the foule ; and confequently are 

 not capable of verity or falfity , but are like pictures made at fan- 

 lie, fomc one of which may happen to be like fome Pcrfon, but 

 cannot be faid to be the picture of him, becaule it was not drawn 

 from him : fo thefe bare apprchcnfions,becaufe there is not in the 

 man union of the foule to the outward world,or to the Exiftence 

 which actuateth its objecljtherefore they make not the foule to 

 be the image of the things exiftent : but the judgement, which 

 ftill taketh a thing exiftent,or as exiftent,in the fubjeft of the pro- 

 poiuion,drawethitspicT:ure from the thing it felfe: and there- 

 fore it maketh the Ibule to be well or ill painted, in refpecl of the 

 thing that is true or falfe. 



And this is the reafon, why in one fenfe doubtful! propofiti- 

 ons, which the underftanding (not being yet refolvedj maketh 

 inquiringly to informc it felfe of the truth of them, cannot be faid 

 to be true or falfe ; for all that while, the foule yecldeth no aflent 

 unto them, either one way or other; yet in another fenfe they 

 may, which is, taking them asfubjefts that theundcrftanding dc- 

 termineth unto it felfe to treat of: for there being two extremes 

 in them, and the propofition confiding in this, whether thefe 

 extremes be identified or no, it folio weth, that fince one part 

 muft of neccflity be , fuch a propofition fpoken at randome, 

 or written by chance without defigne , is of neceflity cither 



true 



