52 ATREATISE 



nature^f a foule, we can as litle exprefle the manner, how it is 

 done by a foule. Yet, before we take our leave of this matter of 

 Apprehcnfions, we will in due place endeavour to fay foraething 

 towards the clearing of this obfcure point. 



5. Our fecond confutation upon the nature of Apfrehcnfion, was, 



The notionof that our primary and maine notion, is of Being. This difcove- 

 .> . r 1 1S reth fome litle elympfeof the nature of the foule : for it is mani- 



mnatc m the , n f n , , * n 



foule doth fell that the applyeth this notion, as well to no parts, astoparts: 

 prove'thcfamc. which we proved in the firft Trcatife, when we QIC wed that we 

 have a particular notion of //?*f,diftincT: from the notion of 

 Quantity- for quantity and parts being the fame, it followeth that 

 if there fee a notion fuppofcd by quantity , (as in fubftance there 

 is) it muft of neceflity abftracT: from parts: and confcqaently, 

 wee may conclude, that the notion of Being, which is indiffe- 

 rently applyable either to quantity or to fubftance, doth of its 

 owne nature wholly abftraft either from Parts , or from no 

 Parts. I then inferre : that fmce this notion of Being , is the 

 very firft and virgin notion our foule is imbued with or is capable 

 of, and that it is the root of all other notions 3 ajid into which 

 fhec refolveth every other notion, in fuch fort , as when we have 

 fjfted and fearfed thceflfence of any notion whatfoever , we can 

 difcovcr nothing that is deeper then this,or precedent to it, and 

 that it agrecth fo compleatly with our foule, as fhe feemeth to be 

 nothing clfe but a capacity fitted to Being , it csnnot be denied , 

 but that our foule muft necdes have a very neare affinity and 

 refemblance of nature with it : but it is evident , that Being 

 hath not of it fclfe any parts in it, nor of it felfe is capable 

 of divifion : and therefore it is as evident , that the foule which 

 is framed fas it werej by that patterns and Idea, and is fitted 

 for Being as for its end , muft alfo of it felfc be voyde of parts, 

 and be incapable of divifion. For how can parts be fitted to an 

 indivifiblc thing? And ho wean two fuch different natures ever 

 meet pi oportionably ? 



If it bi objected, that the very notion of Being , from whence 

 wee eftimatethe nature of the foule, is accommodable to parts : 

 as for example, wee fee that iubftance is endewed with quan- 

 tity. Weanfwer, that eventhisdothcorroborateourproofe: for 

 feeing that the fubftances, which our icnfes are acquainted with- 

 all, have parts, and cannot be without parts; and yet neverthe- 



lefle 



