OF MANS SOULE. Chap. V. 53 



leflein our foulc , the notion of fuch fubftance is found witheut 

 parts; it is clcare , that fuch fubftance hath this meerly from our 

 foule: and becaife it hath this indivisibility from our foule, it 

 folio wet h that our fonle hath a power and nature to beftow in- 

 divifibility upon what coincth into her. And fincc it cannot be 

 denyed , but that if any fnbftancc were once exiRent without 

 parts, it could never after have partf ; it is evident , that the na- 

 ture of the foule is incapable of parts , becaufe it is exiftent 

 without parts. And that it is in fuch fort exiftent, iscleare: 

 for this erfcft of the fouks giving indivifibility unto what fhee 

 rec'.iveth into her , proceedeth from her as (hee is exiftent. 

 Now fince this notion of Being , is of all others the firft and 

 Original! notion that is in the foulc , it muft needs abore 

 all others, favour moft of the proper and genuine nature of 

 the foule: in which, and by which , it is what it is, and hath 

 its indivifibility. 



If then it be preffcd; how can fubftance (in reality or in things) 

 be accommodated unto Quantity , feeing that of it felfe it is indi- 

 vifible? Weeanfwer, that fuch fubftance, as is the fub/cft of 

 Quantity, and that hath .Quantity , is not indivifible ; for fuch 

 fubftance cannot be fubfiftent without Quantity ; and when we 

 frame a notion of it, as being in^voiJUlt^i it an cf&ft of the force 

 of our foule, that is able to draw a notion out of a thing that hath 

 parts, without drawing the notion of the parts : which (heweth 

 manifcftly , that in her there is a power above having of parts: 

 which being in her,argeth herexiftence to be fuch. 



Our laft confideration upon the nature of apprehenfion , was, 4. 

 hew all that is added to the notion ot Being , is nothing elfe bat The fame Is 

 refretls of one thing to another j and how by thefc refpttts t 

 the things of the world come to be in our foule. The evidence we 

 may draw from hence of our foules immateriality , will be not a 

 whit lefle,then either of the two former: for let us caft oar looks 

 over all that commcth into ourfcnfes, and fee if from one end 

 to another , we can meet with fuch a thing as we call a refpctt : 

 it hath neither figure , nor colour , nor fmell , nor motion , 

 nertafte, nor touch; it hath no fimilitude tobedrawne out of 

 by meancs of our fenfcs : to be like, to be h*lfc t to be cxttfc , or ef- 

 feft t what is it? The things (indeed) that are fo, have their refem- 

 blanccsand pictures; but which way (hould a Painter goe about to 



Ddd 3 draw 



