OF MANS SOULE. Chap. V. 57 



unities : but then the undemanding commeth;and joyncth under 

 one netion,what the fenfc kept afunder in fo many fcverall ones, 

 as there are things. The notion of three, oroffr*, is not in the 

 things, but in our mind -, for why three rather then fire, or ten ra- 

 ther then twelve, if the matter of which we fpeak were not deter- 

 inincu ? and fuch determination ofthe matter, is an cffcft of the 

 underftanding.If I had fpeken of things, as I did of men, or of 

 chaires,therc had been more then three or ten : it is then evident, 

 that what determined my fpeecb, made the number be three 

 ortenne. 



Aguine,we fee that the notion of ten, is but one notion ; for as 

 the name of tcn,is but one figne,fo it argueth, that there is but one 

 notion,by which it is the figne often things. Bcfides,we fee that 

 Arithmetitians doe find out the proprieties and particular nature 

 of any determinate number:and therefore we may conclude,that 

 eve.ry number hath a definition, and a peculiar nature of its owne, 

 as it is a number. If then this definition, or nature, or notion of 

 tfn,bt a corporeall one, it is a corporeall fimiiitude of the object. 

 But is it like to any one of the thirrgs,or is it like to all the ti. j n ? If 

 to any nf,then that one will be ten ; if it be like to the whole 

 made of ten,thcn that whole being but one, ten will be j'uft on*, 

 and not ten things. 



Befides,tobe^,dothexprcfly imply tobenotone : how then 

 can that be a materiall thing, which by being one reprefenteth 

 many ? Seeing that in materiall things, one anJ awtfjareop- 

 pofite, and exclude one another from the fame fubj^cT: ? And 

 yet, this notion could not reprefent many together, but by be- 

 ing one. 



Againe, if it be a materiall notion or fimilirade, it is cyther 

 in an indif ifiblc of the braine, or it is in a divifiblc part of it ; I 

 meanc,that the whole eflence ofthe notion be in every part never 

 fo little ofthe braine,or that one part ofthe eflerce, be in one part 

 ofthe braine, and that another part of the eflknce , be in another ' 

 part ofthe brain. If you fiy,that the whole efllncs is in every part 

 of the brainc,though never fo little; you make itimpofliblcthat 

 itfhoald bcabody; for you make it the likenefle of ten determi- 

 nate bodies, in an indtviiiblc manner ; feeing that what by divi- 

 fion groweth not u-fle, hath the nature of an indivifible but if 

 yon lay , that divers parts of the cffcnce , ire in divers parts 



of 



