A TREATISE 



of the braine, then you make it impoflible that the notion of 

 tenne, fhould be indivifible ; fince it felfe iscompofed of feve- 

 rall parts. 



In a word, tenne things cannot be reprefented materially, but 

 by ten other;things : and therefore it is moft evident, that the 

 foulc which reprdcnteth ten by one thing or notion, doth not 

 reprefent the tenne materially : and confequently , that her felf 

 isimmateriall. 



What we have now faid, will be confirmed by confidering the 

 termes,^andw>6*/<?: foritiscleare,thatthefetermesalfo, are 

 of the nature of numbers j bntwithall, doe expreffe particularly 

 that no part is wanting. If then the notion of AH or wholefie faid 

 tobemateriallorquantirative,itmutt: bedivifible : but if you di- 

 vide it, nopartremaincthy^^or whole: it is not therefore divifi- 

 ble ; and confequently it is not materiall. And as this argument 

 is rmnifeftlyapplyable to numbers, fo if'we looke into the argu- 

 ments concerning numbers, you will fiad all them likcwife ap- 

 ply able to thefe termes, AH and whole. 



T1 9' , Out of what hath been hitherto difcorered, we may gather 

 onsof Sefoulc ^is note .' that it is the nature ot the foule,to draw from divifibi- 

 drawmgal- lity,to indivifibility ; from multitude, to unity j from indeter- 

 wayes from minatencfle and confufion, to a clarity and deter mination : as ap- 

 e to p earet h evidently in this laft example of Collections ; in which, 

 whether we take numbers, or other collective termes, we fee 

 that throughout their natures doe confift in fuch a perfect indivifi- 

 bility s as no part can be feparatcd without dt.ftroying the.effencc 

 of the notion .- nay, things which in thtmfelvesare many and 

 confift in parts, doe in the mind get ati impartible nature 5 for ten, 

 is nolonger/r,ifitbedivided : nor*#, is *U> if any thing be 

 taken away. In the fame manner, though Philofophy teach us, 

 there be neither points in bignefle, nor inibnts in motion or 

 time, yet nature maketh us expreffeall bignefle by points, and 

 all time by inftants ; the foule ever fixing it felfe upon indi- 

 visibility. 



Andthisisthereafon , why we attribute the nature of fub- 

 ftance to all our notions : if we fee a thing white, or blacker doe, 

 or fufTcr, or be in a place, or in time ; prefently in our apprehenfl- 

 ons we conceive thefc modifications of the thing,like fubftances; 

 and accordingly we call them by fubftantive names, 



