A TREATISE 



ledge , that the foule is another kind of engine, then all thofe 

 which are in the ftorehoufe of bodies. 



THE SIXT CHAPTER. 



Containing prtofes out ofottr fettles operations in knowing or 

 deeming any thing y thatjbe if ofafyirituall nature. 



OVr next confederation {hall be to fee what teftimony our 

 manner of Judging faih yecld us of the nature of the foule : 

 jVdging er^dce- concerning which, three things offer themfclves, worthy the re- 

 mingby appre- flefting on ; which are, our manner of thinking j the opposition 

 bending two w hich frequently occurreth in our thoughts , and the nature of 



i o I ' As f r the firft, we may remember how 



prove theVoulc wc haveftiewed,^thtt all judgement 01 deeming is but anappre- 

 tobeimmatc- henfion of identification, orfomething immediately following 

 mil. out of it : and that a fetled judgement or aflcnt of the mind is as it 



were a limbe, or branch, or graft in our foule; fo that we findc 

 that our perceiving of identification between two things, or our 

 feeing that the one is the other, is that by which our foule encrea- 

 feth. NoWjbccaufe when two things arc identified, the one rea- 

 , cheth not further then the other,it is clear that thisincreafe of the 

 foule is not made by parts, which being added one to another do 

 caufeittobe greater.- and therefore, fince this latter courfe is 

 the only means of incre'afe in bodies and in quantity, it is as clear 

 that the nature ef the foule, is quite different from the nature of 

 all corporeallor Quantitative things. 



Againe, it is againft the nature of identification, to be of parts; 

 and therefore, they who take quantity to be one thing, and not 

 many things tyed togethcr,doe acknowledge that truly there are 

 no parts in it: and this is fo rigoroufly true,that although wee 

 fpeak of two things that in reality ire identified one with ano- 

 ther, yet if our words be fuch, as imply that ourunderftanding 

 confidereth them as diftinft parts,and by abftraftion giveth them 

 the nature of partsjthen they are no longer identify ed,but in good 

 Logick, we ought in this cafe to deny the one of the other. As for 

 example: though the hand and the foot be the fame thing, (as 

 we hire declared in our firft Treatife) yet becaufr in the name 



