OF MANS SOULE. Chap. VI. 65 



tioned to the reception of bodies ) and that the foulc imbibeth 

 them together without any difficulty or contrail , and prefervcth 

 them alwayes friends even in the face of one another, and lodgeth 

 them together in the fame bed; and that (in a word) thefe oppo- 

 fite things doe enjoy an admirable and unknowne manner of Be- 

 ing in the ioule , and which hath no parallel nor argument in 

 bodily things : wee may ( I fay ) boldly conclude , that the 

 foulc it felfc , in which all thefe are, is of a nature., and hath a 

 manner of Being altogether unlike the nature of bodies, and their 

 manner of Being. 



Out of this agreeing of all objects in the foule, and their having 4. 

 no oppofition there, even whiles (hee knoweth the oppofition That the firft 

 that is between them in theinfelves , there followeth anoth 

 confideration , of nolcflfc importance : which is , that the am- . 1 to 

 plitudcofourfoukinrefped: of knowledge, is abfolutely infi- 

 nite; that is to fay , (hee is capable of knowing at the fame time 

 objects without end or meafure. For the explicating whereof, 

 we are to confider, that the latter conclufion^, which the foul gai- 

 ncth knowledge of, doe hang to the former by identification , or 

 by the foules feeing that twonotions are identified, becaufethcy 

 are identified to a third, as is before exrn-efled; and the firft princi- 

 ples which feem to be immediately joyned unto the the feule, 

 have the identity of their termes plaine and evident, even in the 

 very termes themfelves. Nay, if we infift further , wee fliall find 

 that the firft truths muft have an identification to the very foule it 

 felfc; for it being evident that truth or f alfhood, is not in the foule 

 but fofarre forth, as (he doth apply her felfe to the externall ob- 

 jeft, ortotheexiftence of things in themfelves; and that we 

 find that the foules knowing with evidence that any thing it or 

 hath being, implyeth her knowing that her felfe #; (forfliee 

 cannot know that a thing feemeth fo to her, or maktth fuch 

 an impreflion in her , without knowing that her felfe /*; 

 though peradventure fhe may not know what her felfe is , but 

 taketh her felfe to bee no other thing then the body of the 

 man in which ftiee is) it is evident that the firft truths which 

 enter into the fcule, to wit , that this or that feemeth fb 

 or fo unto her , ( and thefe truthes no fcepticke ever doub- 

 ted of ) are identifyed with the foule it felfe ; feeing that an 



E c c objeft 



