May 9, 1918]' 



NATURE 



95 



cerned are human, if not humanistic, and that they 

 all belong to the same genus, if not to the same 

 >!).'cies. 



There is included also in the extensive correspond- 



i e on which this section is mainly based a special 

 vwiuribution of letters furnished mostly by university 

 jntsidents and professors and by men of letters selected 

 \\ ith the view of excluding all those who might be 



^I^ected of any non-humanistic predilections. These 



lors were received as replies to a communication 



-Lied first during the year 1910, and occasionally 

 -iiue then, soliciting counsel from those well qualified 

 to assist the institution in determining how it may 

 l)t St promote research and progress in the humanities 

 .ind how it may be relieved of the charge of unfairness 

 :ii wards them in the allotment of its income. The 

 — ntial paragr/aphs in this communication are the 



lowing : — ■ 



■ Amongs-t other suggestions arising naturally in this 

 inquiry is that of the desirability of something like a 

 working definition of the term 'humanities.' To the 

 question, What are the humanities? one finds <i variety 

 of answers, some of which seem much narrower than 

 dt sirable. 



"In order to get additional information on this sub- 

 jtct, and in order to make this part of the inquiry as 

 concrete and definite as possible, I am sending copies 

 of the enclosed list of publications to a number of 

 friends, requesting them to mark those entries of 

 the list which they, as individuals, would consider 

 works falling properly in the fields of the humanities. 

 I shall esteem it a great favour, therefore, if you will 

 kindly examine this list, indicating bv some sort of 

 check-mark what works, if any, may be rightly so 

 classed, and then mail the same in the enclosed 

 stamped enveloi>e. It will be of service also to indicate 

 to me, if you care to do so, the lines of distinction 

 which may be drawn between the humanistic sciences 

 and the physical sciences. I am sure you will agree 

 with me that it will be a decided aid to all of us to 

 secure something like common definitions for these 

 boundaries of knowledge." 



About thirty distinguished authors have participated 

 in this symposium ; and their frank and generous, 

 expressions of opinion would be well worthy of pub- 

 lication if they had not been assured that their re- 

 sponses would not be used for such a purpose. It is 

 believed that no confidence will be violated in stating 

 the two following statistical facts, which not only agree 

 with one another, but strongly confirm also the in- 

 ductions referred to above, drawn from the more 

 miscellaneous correspondence of the institution : — 



(i) The definitions of the term "humanities" vary 

 from the exclusiveness of literature alone to the inclu- 

 siveness of the more recent definitions of anthropology, 

 with a noteworthy tendency towards inclusiveness 

 rather than the reverse. 



(2) To the concrete question. What works, if anv, 

 already published by the institution fall in the humani- 

 ties? the answers vary from two to thirty-three, the 

 number of publications up to iqio being 146. 



In the meantime, while waiting: for a diminution 

 in the diversity of opinion, it appears to be the duty 

 of the institution to proceed, as it has sought to 

 proceed hitherto, in a spirit of sympathv and equity 

 based on merit towards all domains of knowledge, 

 with a full appreciation of the necessary limitations 

 of any singfle organisation, and with a respectful but 

 untrammelled regard for the views, the sentiments, 

 and the suffrages of our contemporaries. 



Aherrani Types of Mind. 

 If words and phrases drawn out of the past may 

 obscure thought and supplant re-ason in the domains 



NO. 2532, VOL. lOl] 



of the less highly developed sciences, like the humani- 

 ties, for example, they are by no means free from 

 difficulties when used as media for the communication 

 of ideas in the domains of the more highly developed 

 sciences. The differences between the ambiguities 

 and the obscurities of the two domains are mainly 

 in degree rather than in kind. It is a truism, of 

 course, that in general it is much easier to discover 

 errors and to improve uncertain verbal expression in 

 the definite than in the indefinite sciences. Erroneous 

 statements and interpretations of fact may be often 

 corrected by the facts themselves or by means of a 

 knowledge of their relations to underlying principles. 

 Precision and correctness of language are also greativ 

 increased in any department of learning when it be'- 

 comes susceptible to the economy of thought and of 

 expression characteristic of the mathematico-physical 

 sciences. The perfection of these latter is, indeed, so 

 great that novices working in them are often carried 

 safely over hazardous ground to sound conclusions 

 without adequate apprehension of the principles in- 

 volved and with only erroneous verbal terms at com- 

 mand to designate the facts and the phenomena con- 

 sidered. 



Nevertheless, it must be admitted that the termin- 

 ology of what commonly passes for science, as well ' 

 as the terminology used frequently even by eminent 

 men of science, is sadly in need of reformation in 

 the interests of clear thinking, and hence of unequi- 

 vocal popular and technical exposition. To realise the 

 vagueness and the inappropriateness in much of the 

 current use of this terminology, one needs onlv to 

 examine the voluminous literature available in almost 

 any subject called scientific. It is so much easier 

 to appear to write well, or even brilliantly, than it is 

 to think clearly, that facile expression is often mis- 

 taken for sound thought. Thus, to illustrate, while 

 in physics the terms force, power, and energy have 

 acquired technical meanings entirely distinct and free 

 from ambiguity, they are commonly used as syno- 

 nyms, and quite too commonly to designate proper- 

 ties, sentiments, and influences to which their applica- 

 tion is meaningless. The "forces," the "powers." 

 and, more recently, the "energies" of "Nature" are 

 frequently appealed to in popular literature; and a 

 familiar bathos consists in equipping them solemnly 

 with the now vanishing stable furniture " for the 

 benefit of mankind." Science is disfigured and hin- 

 dered also by much inherited antithetical terminologv 

 for which reasons once existent have now disappeared 

 or are disappearing. Instances are found in such 

 terms as metaphysics, natural history, and natural 

 science, the two latter of which appear to have come 

 down to us without sensible modification, except for 

 a vast increase in content, since the days of Plinv the 

 Elder. The diversification and the resulting rnulti- 

 plication of meanings of the terms of science are 

 everywhere becominc" increasingly noticeable and con- 

 fusing. One of the most recent manifestations is 

 seen in the phrase "scientific and industrial research," 

 which probably means about the same thing as the 

 equally uncertain phrase "pure and aoplied science"; 

 whiFe both phrases have been turned to account in 

 setting up invidious distinctions inimical to the pro- 

 gress of all concerned. 



This looseness in the use of terminolocv inherited 

 from our predominantly literary predecessors and the 

 prevailing absence of any exacting standards of ex- 

 cellence in exposition make it easy for that large class 

 here designated as aberrant types to take an unduly 

 prominent part in the evolution of anv establishment 

 founded for the promotion of "research and discoverv 

 and the application of knowledge for the improve- 

 ment of mankind." These types are numerous, and 



