December 6, 19 17] 



NATURE 



263 



systems. The difficulty in forming- any clear con- 

 ception at present of the physico-chemical origin of 

 life, or of completely understanding- life as a 

 physico-chemical system, is fully acknowledged, 

 j but is passed by as presenting a problem which 

 cannot yet be solved owing to the imperfection of 

 existing knowledge. 



The general scope of Prof. Henderson's argu- 

 ment, which is presented with much interesting 

 detail, is as follows. The actual distribution of 

 properties among the actual elements, and par- 

 ticularly carbon, oxygen, and hydrogen, is of such 

 a nature as to give a maximum of freedom in the 

 process of evolution. 



So far as the known properties of matter are con- 

 cerned, considering them both quantitatively and quali- 

 tatively, every other sensibly different distribution of 

 the properties among the elements- would involve great 

 restrictions. Thus conditions are actually established 

 (relatively to other imaginable arrangements of the 

 properties of matter) for the existence of the greatest 

 possible number, diversity, and duration of systems, 

 phases, components, and activities. So it comes about 

 that, in every physical respect, the process of evolution 

 is free to produce more rather than less. 



It cannot be that the nature of this relationship is, 

 like organic adaptations, mechanically conditioned. 

 For relationships are mechanically conditioned in a sig- 

 nificant manner only when there is opportunity for 

 modification through interaction. But here the things 

 related are supposed to be changeless in time, or, in 

 short, absolute properties of the universe. According 

 to the theory of probabilities, this connection between 

 the properties of matter and the protess of evolution 

 cannot be due to mere contingency. Therefore, since 

 the physico-chemical functional relationship is not in 

 question, there must be admitted a functional relation- 

 ship of another kind, somewhat like that known to 

 physiology. This functional relationship can onlv be 

 described as teleological. 



The author is content with the conclusion that 

 tlie universe has a teleological arrangement in 

 relation to organic evolution. He carefully avoids 

 all theological inferences, and leaves us with 

 teleological arrangement as an ultimate and mys- 

 terious empirical fact. Granted his initial assump- 

 tion that what we call Nature is nothing but a 

 physico-chemical universe in the sense at present 

 currently accepted, we do not see how his general 

 argument can be shaken. It is not only strik- 

 ingly original, but also very cogent, and seems 

 ' certain to exercise much influence on the general 

 trend of philosophical thought in connection with 

 natural science. 



If we may offer any criticism of the argument 

 il is this. The conception of a living organism 

 in connection with its environment as a physico- 

 chemical system in the sense of current physical 

 chemistry fails to express the facts of biology. 

 If we call it a system it is a system in which 

 relationship to the whole determines both the 

 constitution and the activities of the parts. These 

 parts and activities, including biological environ- 

 ment, are a function of iheir relation to the other 

 parts, and therefore to the whole : hence biology 

 deals, not merely w-ith the "efficient" causes of, 

 ordinary physics and chemistry, but also with what" 

 Aristotle called "final " causes. In biological facts 

 NO. 2510, VOL. too] 



teleology is revealed as immanent in Nature — as 

 of its essence, and no mere accident, and as in- 

 herent in environment, and not merely in what 

 we ordinarily distinguish as the bodies of organ- 

 isms. It seems to follow that the detailed ex- 

 tension of biological conceptions to what we at 

 present regard as the inorganic world can only be 

 a matter of the further extension of knowledge. 

 We have not at present the data for this ex- 

 tension : hence the teleological constitution of the 

 inorganic world can only appear to us as a mys- 

 terious empirical fact, and cannot appear other- 

 wise when we assume at the outset that the 

 universe is composed of material units as eternal 

 and unchangeable independent entities. The 

 question inevitably raised by Prof. Henderson's 

 book is whether this assumption is valid, and 

 whether we must not look to the future penetra- 

 tion of physics and chemistry by conceptions akin 

 to those of biology. In the latter case teleological 

 reasoning will take a natural place in the physical 

 sciences. J. S. H. 



HIGHER ALGEBRA AND DYNAMICS. 



(i) A First Course in Higher Algebra. By Prof. 



Helen A. Merrill and Dr. Clara E. Smith. 



Pp. xiv-h 247. (New York : The Macmillan Co. ; 



London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1917.) 



Price 6s. 6d. net. 

 (2) Problems in Dynamics {with Full Solutions) 



for the B.A. Students {Pass and Honours) of 



the Indian Universities. By Atma Ram. Pp. 



245 + diagrams 16. (Anarkali, Lahore : Atma 



Ram and Sons.) Price 35. 



(i) /^F these two bot>ks, the first is interesting 

 ^^ as being the work of two American ladies 

 who are colleagues in the same institution. Each 

 of the authors is a Ph.D., and for this and other 

 reasons we may surmise that they received a good 

 part of their training in Germany. They are 

 keenly interested in their subject, have studied its 

 history, and are acquainted with some of its most 

 recent aspects. Thus equipped, they have chosen 

 for their main topics rational, irrational, and 

 (ordinary) complex numbers, logarithms, theory 

 of equations, and elementary calculus. Each 

 chapter is headed by an appropriate quotation ; 

 there are a number of historical notes, and some 

 references are made to more advanced text- 

 books. All this is to the good, and the authors, 

 on the whole, have carried out their programme 

 successfully. 



But, unless we are mistaken, this is their first 

 book, and, like all first books, it has the inevitable 

 faults of the beginner, the chief of these being 

 a want of clearness, or a want of detail, just 

 where they are most required. To illustrate this, 

 we will turn to the chapter on the theor\' of 

 equations. In their "proof" of Descartes' rule of 

 signs they put down the usual -t- , - , ± diagram, 

 and then say: "The original polvnomial had five 

 changes of sign, while the resulting one has at 

 least six, even when the ambiguous signs are so 



