April i, 1920] 



NATURE 



135 



themselves so tied and hobbled as to be practically 

 helpless. 



It does not seem feasible, in fact, usefully to 

 organise research on such lines. Research — and 

 design, for that matter — speaking again of the little 

 corner I knew, has been almost invariably the result 

 of the strenuous effort of individuals, and ndt the fruit 

 of the organisation in which these particular indi- 

 viduals happen to have been embedded at the time. 

 It is not meant to imply that there should be no 

 organisation in Government experimental establish- 

 ments, but, speaking from experience, I feel most 

 strongly that capable investigators and designers will 

 not produce their best if compelled to work in an 

 atmosphere of over-organisation. 



What must surely be a matter for congratulation 

 to the body of scientific workers in the country is the 

 fact, which the article referred to brings out, that the 

 Army (and presumably also the Navy and the Air 

 Force) has learnt its lesson, and hastens to admit that 

 there is something to be gained even in peace from 

 the universities and other scientific and technical 

 institutions. Yet here again one seems to detect — 

 perhaps in pessimism — a touch of misunderstanding. 

 The Government's policy (expressed in the following 

 rather unfortunate words) is "to farm out to civil 

 scientific institutions, such as the universities, the 

 National Physical Laboratory, the Imperial College 

 of Science, etc., all pure research that can be profit- 

 ably farmed out." The universities will surely be 

 only too willing to give the most sympathetic con- 

 sideration to a co-operative scheme of this sort, pro- 

 vided that the subject-matter of the researches to be 

 " farmed out " is sufficiently interesting and important. 



Presumably the Department of Scientific and Indus- 

 trial Research will be largely responsible for the alloca- 

 tion of these researches, but if at the same time the 

 smallest step is taken towards "the detection of over- 

 lap [in research], where such exists, and its elimina- 

 tion," a feeling the reverse of sympathetic will be 

 set up. 



Investigations worthy of the name should surely 

 be carried out in all freedom of both thought and 

 action ; even the suspicion of interference would be 

 intolerable. The official interest now taken by the 

 Army in scientific research is a great sign of regenera- 

 tion^-! f. indeed, it is more than a surface interest, 

 as we all hope. Let us pray that over-organisation 

 of the Government experimental establishments and 

 unsympathetic treatment of civil scientific institutions 

 will not dwarf the growth of the new scheme. 



R. Whiddington. 



The University, Leeds, March 23. 



The leading article in Nature of March 18 directs 

 timely attention to the need for action by men of 

 science if the lessons of the war are not to be for- 

 gotten in the Army of the future. 



It was impossible in the war to scrap the old 

 machine ; vears and experience are essential if a 

 better new one is to be made. But no memorandum 

 or paper policy, or even consultation with experts, 

 will make a good machine unless the right material 

 is used. 



In peace-time the new Army should have technical 

 education (in the broad sense) and scientific research 

 as its two main functions ; thev are the only sound 

 bases upon which an efficient fighting machine can 

 be built. That appears to be accepted. But these 

 functions can only be performed by an Army with an 

 educated staff, led by scientific men who combine 

 originality with administrative capacitv. If the main 

 bodv of the staff consists of men without the rudi- 

 ments of a scientific education, who will "administer" 



NO. 2631, VOL. 105] 



the men of science and control the allocation of funds, 

 then there will be a largely unnecessary sacrifice of 

 the Army if a great emergency arises. 



With regard to the co-ordination of research, it is true 

 that a good deal of duplication must inevitably occur 

 if the indei>endence essential for great discoveries is 

 to be maintained. But there is much unnecessary 

 waste which can be avoided without real restriction 

 of independence. The direct economy is, however, 

 of minor importance ; the greatest advantage comes 

 from forming the habit of consulting the right depart- 

 ment or the right expert ; and this is as necessary for 

 the man of science as for any other man. The late 

 Lt. -Col. W. Watson, whose untimely death deprived the 

 nation of an expert with an almost unrivalled know- 

 ledge of the applications of science in war, once 

 related how a board of chemists spent half a day 

 discussing a meteorological problem which could have 

 been solved in half an hour by a single meteorological 

 expert. E. Gold. 



March 22. 



All scientific workers whose research has brought 

 them into contact with military authority during the 

 war must appreciate the leading article on " Science 

 and the New Army" in Nature of March 18, especially 

 the sentences in which it is urged that " science linked 

 to the Armv by fussy research co-ordinators acting 

 under a nescient soldier will not solve the difficulty," 

 and that "science will not occupy its rightful position 

 in the new Army" until the General Staff includes a 

 due proportion of officers who are endowed with^ a 

 scientific spirit and have received a scientific train- 

 ing. Until then some of the outstanding defects 

 manifested during the war will continue. These 

 defects are : — 



(i) The unthinking application of scientific research. 

 A good instance of this occurred in the issue of the 

 ridiculously excessive diet (based on research under 

 active marching conditions) to our soldiers in Flanders 

 who were unexercised in the trenches, whilst wholly 

 inadequate rations were being supplied during the 

 period of the soldiers' strenuous training in England. 



(2) The delay in seeking expert advice. Too often 

 G.H.Q. failed to realise how expert advice could help 

 it, and did not trouble to seek it until too late. 



(3) The choice of expert. The truly scientific 

 worker rarely asserted himself spontaneously during 

 the war; he waited until his advice was asked. The 

 man who forced himself to the notice of the General 

 Staff as an expert was usuallv unscientific. Thus 

 G.H.Q. was "taken in," and came to rely too often 

 on those whom the scientific world considered as being 

 pretentious in greater or less degree. Their one source 

 of strength was that they were usually "practical' 

 men, whereas the men of science in some cases 

 offered suggestions which could scarcely be carried 

 out during service in the field. But in the long run 

 the Armv suffered. Charles S. Myers. 



30 Montagu Souare, W.t, March 2q. 



Knowledge and Power. 



The leading article "Knowledge and Power" in 

 Nature of March 25 strikes a resonant chord. I am 

 a newcomer into the realms of officialdom, but my 

 experience relates to a Department of State which is 

 of new growth and not yet rooted in tradition.^ .Aero- 

 nautics in Britain has had its foundations laid on a 

 scientific basis, and technical staffs have been able to 

 build on trustworthy data. In view of the fact that 

 British aircraft obtained an absolute ascendancy over 

 the craft of any other country. Allied or enemy, and 

 that Britain was the onlv country with this scientific 



