x^.UGUST 5, 1920] 



NATURE 



loi 



hold-up of tanks at Flesqui^res (p. 149) would 

 not have taken place had the infantry been follow- 

 ing the tanks closely, and could also have been 

 got over by the tank crews getting out of their 

 machines and stalking the field-gunner as in- 

 fantry. The infantry on this occasion were 

 several hundred yards behind ! 



This book makes one hope that someone will 

 write the history of tanks from the civilian point 

 of view. .Read in conjunction with this excellent 

 work, some of the more obvious mistakes in the 

 past might thus be avoided in the future. It is 

 now common knowledge that neither the War 

 Office nor G.H.Q. welcomed "tanks," although it 

 might be inferred from this book that they did so. 

 The tank was fathered by the Navy, and had 

 reached success before it was handed over. Its 

 history was briefly as follows, and it is illuminat- 

 ing how little the Army contributed. 



In Mr. Winston Churchill's letter to the Prime 

 Minister of January, 191 5, he remarks: "It is 

 extraordinary that the Army in the field and the 

 War Office should have allowed nearly three 

 months of warfare to progress without address- 

 ing their minds to its special problems." It "was 

 extraordinary, and more so when they turned 

 down any proposals made to them for breaking 

 down the " trench warfare " into which both 

 armies had settled. Mr. Winston Churchill made 

 direct reference in this letter to armoured cater- 

 pillars and the way in which they should be 

 employed. 



There were many schemes put forward for 

 carrying out this suggestion, but the successful 

 one was produced by Major W. G. Wilson, who 

 was then a lieutenant, R.N.V.R., in the Royal 

 Naval Armoured Cars. Working in conjunction 

 with Mr. (now Sir) William Tritton at the works 

 of Messrs. Foster, of Lincoln, the machine was 

 constructed and afterwards demonstrated at Hat- 

 field. The designers called for a statement from 

 the Army as to the width of trench to be crossed, 

 height of parapet to be cHmbed, etc., and this was 

 drawn up by Col. Swinton, who stands out at this 

 time as practically the only champion tanks had 

 in the Army. 



Although the Navy fathered the production of 

 the first tank, it was equally fortunate that after 

 its success had been demonstrated at Hatfield to 

 representatives from the War Office and G.H.Q., 

 France, the future of tanks was entrusted to 

 Sir Albert Stern. It was he who, when the first 

 order for tanks was cancelled by the War Office, 

 refused to cancel the order, and said he would, if 

 necessary, pay for them himself. 



Again, fate was kind to them on their first 

 venture at the battle of the Somme. On Sep- 

 NO. 26^0. VOT. Tncl 



. tember 15, 1916, two companies, each consisting 

 of twenty-eight tanks, went into action. The 

 company commanded by Major Summers got 

 twenty-two machines into action, but only two of 

 the other company crossed into No-man's Land. 

 It is more than likely that, but for the efforts of 

 Summers and his technical officer, Knothe, tanks 

 would have been voted a failure and never given 

 another trial. It is worth noting that both these 

 officers were, prior to the war, civilians 



Again, it seems never to have been pointed out 

 how the Army authorities failed to grasp the full 

 importance of other proposals of the tank tribe. 

 In 1916 the need of the moment was such pro- 

 tection against the machine-gun, but the early 

 pioneers of the tank movement saw far greater 

 possibilities in the caterpillar track. It was 

 evident that roads and railways were the serious 

 limiting factors to our armies: All supplies had 

 to go by rail and road, and as these could be 

 destroyed by the enemy's long-range artillery, 

 the obvious need was for an alternative — some- 

 thing that could do without road or rails, and 

 cross ploughed fields, shelled areas, hedges, and 

 small rivers. The caterpillar track as used on tanks 

 had been proved to be capable of doing this. 

 Rightly or wrongly, the first attempt was made 

 to design a caterpillar gun-carriage that would 

 take a 5-in. gun or a 6-in. howitzer, or alterna- 

 tively could be used to carry a large number of 

 rounds of ammunition for either of these guns. It 

 was designed so that the gun could be trained and 

 fired from this movable platform, and the whole 

 be capable of crossing shell-holes and trenches like 

 the tank. The machine was tested at Shoebury- 

 ness, the gun being fired and trained with 

 ease. Its value was never realised, and the scheme 

 was allowed to drop. True, fifty machines of the 

 first type were built, but nothing was ever made 

 of the generic idea, and a second improved type, 

 in which the faults of the first had been over- 

 come, was allowed to lapse. 



In the autumn of 1918 the value of a cross- 

 country tractor was realised to the extent that 

 many thousands were ordered here and in the 

 U.S.A., but again "realisation" came too late, 

 and none materialised. 



As already stated, the Tank Corps insisted in 

 interfering with design, with the result that pro- 

 gress and output were adversely affected. In 

 numerous cases its wishes were followed, 

 such as the change over from the Hotchkiss to 

 the Lewis gun, the lengthening of the Mk. V. by 

 6 ft., the turning down of the G.C. Mk. II., 

 and the Mk. IX. machine built to its require- 

 ments, and the results were, to say the least, 

 serious. 



