Francis Bacon 25 



all the sole instrument of science is abundantly evident when we 

 consider the methods of knowledge which he elaborates in his 

 "Advancement of Learning." It is natural that a writer whose 

 first purpose is to consider the deficiencies of the then existing 

 body and processes of scientific knowledge should emphasise the 

 lack of practical results derived from deductive or syllogistic 

 reasoning, which he criticises as " being too confused, and letting 

 nature escape from our hands." Bacon realised that in syllogism 

 the conclusion was logically and epistemologically inherent in the 

 major and minor premiss, and that the major premiss itself was 

 a conception the truth of which depended ultimately upon Induc- 

 tion, — a method which up to that time had not been critically 

 examined. Hence, while granting the efficacy of the deductive 

 process for guaranteeing the reality of particular propositions, he 

 questioned the validity of assuming the major premiss merely 

 upon the unscientific process per enumerationem sinipUccm. This 

 antique method of Induction he considered " scanty and slovenly " 

 on account of its unscientific neglect of negative instances ; but, 

 while recognising the deficiencies of the logic of the scientific 

 method of his own day, Bacon was forced to leave its complete 

 working out to the epistemology of the nineteenth century. 



In the attempt to obtain a fair and well-proportioned conception 

 of Bacon's theory of method, there seems therefore to be de- 

 manded a consideration, first, of what he means by the term 

 " method " ; second, of the four great methods of knowledge or 

 experience ; and, third, of various conditions which determine the 

 operation of method. 



(i) Bacon's conception of method, though narrow in com- 

 parison with the modern interpretation of the term, is neverthe- 

 less a great advance upon the earlier restricted use of the word 

 to indicate solely a logical process. Method for Bacon means, 

 in its widest sense, the interpretation of nature, and hence differs 

 from the logical use of the term both genetically and teleologi- 

 cally. Deductive logic begins where Bacon's method ends: it 

 starts with a generalisation ; Bacon ends with a generalisation. 

 Logic ends with the recognition of the nature of a particular; 

 Bacon begins with particulars. He practically anticipates Kant's 

 recognition of the relation between the particular and the uni- 

 versal as represented in the mutual epistemological necessity of 



