Kant 43 



new interpretation, by emphasising the function of Reason as 

 giving validity to the impression of the senses. Instead of mak- 

 ing thought conform to the objects, Kant believed that objects 

 must conform to thought, and that consequently a priori judg- 

 ments were possible. It must be borne in mind at this point, 

 however, that Kant really takes the term object in two different 

 senses : (i) as a thing existing by itself outside of the mind and 

 independent of it; (2) as an object of perception existing in and 

 for the mind. It is this double significance of object that makes 

 it so difficult to relate in a consistent manner the doctrine of the 

 "ding an sich" to the rest of Kant's epistemological system. 



It is to be noted, too, that Kant questions the truth of facts 

 rather than the truth of processes, which is in reality just as 

 much involved in any thorough-going theory of knowledge. 

 There is the danger of attributing reality to objects of sense- 

 perception and not to concepts themselves. Ideas have reality ; 

 and Kant does not always make clear the relation of ideas, 

 things-in-themselves, and the phenomena of sense-experience. 



In his detailed treatment of the process and the objects of 

 knowledge, Kant arbitrarily makes a distinction between " two 

 stems of human knowledge, which perhaps spring from a com- 

 mon but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and under- 

 standing " : 



(i) Sensibility — receptivity for impressions. 

 (2) Understanding — spontaneity of conception. 



The necessity of the interaction of these two is emphasised: 

 " Neither conceptions without a perception in some way corre- 

 sponding to them, nor perception without conceptions can yield 

 any knowledge . . . without sensibility no object would be 

 given to us, and without understanding no object would be 

 thought. Thoughts without content are empty, perceptions with- 

 out conceptions are blind . . . only by their union can knowl- 

 edge arise." 



With these two aspects of knowledge realised, the problem still 

 remains as to the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments. The 

 objects of knowledge will be those which conform to this dual 

 nature of the mind : they will be those aspects of reality which 

 become phenomena of experience by conforming to the neces- 

 sities of man's perceptual and conceptual mind. The correspon- 



