78 TJie Concept of Method 



ing, purpose or end. The ontological inquiry is only regulative; 

 the epistemological is constructive. 



From the mechanical point of view we cannot properly speak 

 of purpose, which is an idea that belongs to the volitional level 

 of existence. Teleology cannot apply to facts as facts, but only 

 to the idea of which they are the manifestation, embodiment, or 

 realisation. Mechanism deals with forms ; Teleology deals with 

 ideas and principles. 



The conception of process implies, in the first place, elements 

 in relation, and, in the second place, ideas becoming realised. 

 The former constitutes the mechanical, and the latter the teleo- 

 logical aspect. From the point of view of the process, into which 

 the moral element does not enter, the idea becomes realised 

 through the interaction of the elements, and we have a progressive 

 relation which depends for its actuality upon the mechanical con- 

 ditions which it presupposes, and for its reality upon the idea 

 which it involves as the epistemological condition of its appear- 

 'ance. 



Relativity is a controlling idea that has been too little em- 

 phasised in teleological thought ; and the various meanings given 

 to the term Teleology by the physicist, the biologist, and the 

 ethical theorist have been overlooked, though it is just these 

 small additional elements that enter into the concept as held by 

 each which cause the real confusion and involve all the logical 

 difficulties in discussion. Purposes or ends in the mechanical and 

 in the biological sphere are obviously different from purposes or 

 ends in the moral sphere, so that the whole question of teleology 

 has been complicated by the confusion of merely mechanical 

 elements with those that are purely volitional in character. In 

 addition to this, the discussion has been colored on both sides 

 by emotion, and has been biased by mutual exclusion on the part 

 of both the scientist and the moralist. 



The conception of purpose does not imply an a priori deter- 

 mination of the means. The distinction between logical neces- 

 sity with regard to form and psychological reality with regard 

 to content must be borne in mind. The fact that the form ap- 

 plies to various kinds of content involves the existence of ten- 

 tative solutions to problematic situations, either physical or in- 

 tellectual or ethical. 



