NATURE 



73 



THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 24, 1892. 



ANIMALS' RIGHTS. 

 Animals' Rights. By H. S. Salt. (London: Bell, 1892.) 



THIS little volume is divided into three main parts, the 

 principle upon which the rights of animals are 

 founded, the various ways in which they have been 

 infringed, and the reforms necessary to secure their full 

 recognition. Notwithstanding, however, the logical form 

 in which the subject is thus set forth, the book is abso- 

 lutely useless both from the ethical and the practical 

 points of view. In the first place the author nowhere 

 attempts to define the relative value of the lower animals 

 as compared with the human race, and although he cer- 

 tainly allows that they possess less " distinctive individu- 

 ality," he condemns the use of the terms by which they 

 are commonly designated (such as dumb beast, live stock, 

 or even animal), on account of the imputation of in- 

 feriority which is involved in them. 



He seems to be totally unaware that not only is the 

 natural affection of animals far less enduring, and their 

 intellect immeasurably weaker, but that of morality, i.e. 

 the doing of right for right's sake alone, unswayed by 

 personal feeling or the influence of others, they have 

 absolutely no conception whatever. 



Ignoring, however, these fundamental distinctions from 

 which the subjection of animals inevitably follows, Mr. 

 Salt at once proceeds to enunciate his theory of their 

 rights. 



This whole question, however, is thrown into absolute 

 chaos by the fact that, for subsequent dealing with the 

 practical aspects of his subject, the author has equipped 

 himself with not merely one but two definitions of 

 animals' rights, differing from each other so widely that 

 while the one involves the unconditional prohibition to 

 kill, eat, or use any harmless animal, the other would 

 admit of all these things being done for good cause 

 shown. Thus on page 9 we find that they have the right 

 to live their own lives with a due measure of that 

 restricted freedom of which Herbert Spencer speaks, 

 i.e. the freedom to do that which they will, provided they 

 infringe not the equal liberty of any other. Except, 

 therefore, in the case of the beasts of prey, who no doubt 

 would " will " to eat man if a convenient opportunity 

 offered, the liberty to sacrifice the lives of animals for 

 human food or indeed to employ them in any way is cut 

 off without reserve. Turn, however, to page 28 and we 

 find that this freedom of animals is no longer restricted 

 merely by the equal freedom of others, but is also 

 " subject to the limitations imposed by the permanent 

 needs and interests of the whole community." A life of 

 dleness and a death from disease or old age and star- 

 vation are no longer secured to them, and the whole 

 principle of the subordination of the interests of the 

 lower race to those of the higher is conceded. 



From the confusion of mind thus exhibited suggestions 

 of practical value can scarcely be expected, nor indeed 

 do we find them in the succeeding parts of the work. 

 Thus we are told that " the contention that man is not 

 morally justified in imposing any sort of subjection on 

 NO. 1204, VOL. 47] 



the lower animals " is one which the author " desires to 

 keep clear of," and pronounces to be " an abstract ques- 

 tion beyond the scope of the present enquiry," yet, as he also 

 states " that no human being is justified in considering 

 any animal as a meaningless automaton to be worked, 

 tortured, or eaten for the mere object of satisfying the 

 wants or whims of mankind," we would submit that he 

 has not kept clear of the matter at all, as we cannot call 

 to mind any forms of subjection which are not included 

 in these three. 



In his discussion of the treatment of domestic animals 

 we would only draw attention to that passage wherein the 

 degrading practice of pampering lap-dogs is rebuked as 

 unworthy of their moral dignity ! In the succeeding 

 chapters the employment of animals in personal decora- 

 tion, sport, and scientific experiment is dilated upon and 

 condemned, and it then only remains to consider the 

 question of the reforms which ought to be instituted. 



The first remedy proposed is that of education. We are 

 all to be taught to be humane, but seeing that this has 

 been, for countless generations, carried into effect by 

 almost every mother with almost every child, the sugges- 

 tion can hardly be accounted novel nor need any great 

 changes in the present condition of affairs be expected 

 from it. Further, there must be a crusade preached against 

 the disregard of the kinship of animals to ourselves, and 

 the laugh must be turned from the so-called sentiment- 

 alists {i.e. those agreeing with the author's views) 

 against certain flesh eaters, sportsmen, and scientific 

 experimentalists whom he seems to have in his mind's 

 eye, and who, seeing that he represents them as advancing 

 absolutely foolish reasons for practices which they could 

 easily defend on common-sense grounds, are very properly 

 described by him as " cranks." 



The second reform is to be found in legislation, and it 

 might naturally be supposed that this should first be 

 applied in that case which Mr. Salt considers to be pro- 

 ductive of the greatest bulk of suffering, namely in that 

 of flesh eating. But this is not so ; he has already said 

 that it is no part of his present purpose to advocate 

 vegetarianism, and he discreetly leaves it to look after 

 itself. The \\ after suggesting that the worrying of tame 

 animals might be classed as baiting, and that im- 

 provements (though what and how he does not say) might 

 be made in the transport of animals, and by substituting 

 public for private slaughter-houses, he demands that 

 the full fury of the law should be turned on to scientific 

 experiment, which must be totally abolished. 



The demand thus made he bases on two grounds : — 

 (i) That nothing is necessary which is abhorrent to the 

 general conscience of humanity, and (2) That it involves 

 hideous injustice to innocent animals, quoting with 

 approval Miss Cobbe's, in this case, specious axiom, that 

 the minimum of all possible rights is to be spared the 

 worst of all possible wrongs. 



How far either of these arguments is applicable here 

 we propose to briefly touch upon. 



In the first place no proof whatever exists that scien- 

 tific experiment is abhorrent to the general conscience, 

 seeing that England is the only country where it is even 

 under legislative supervision, that there, after the most 

 careful deliberation, it is freely allowed on good cause 

 shown, and that the whole body of those qualified to 



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