Vlll PEEFACE. 



until there is reached the concept expressed in the 

 category of Totality with all that this implies; in short, 

 until there is reached the concept of Cause in the 

 sense of a totality that is eternally complete in its own 

 self-activity. And this,, as it seems to me, is just the 

 Persistent Force to which Mr. Spencer's system leads up 

 only with far more adequate and consistent definition 

 than Mr. Spencer gives it. Mr. Spencer traces out an 

 "established order" in the world of Things. Hegel 

 traces out the necessary or "established" order in the 

 world of Thought. 



Thus far these two systems seem on first view to 

 be merely antithetical. And yet, as I have attempted 

 to show in the argument of the present volume, the 

 established order of the world of Things is what it is 

 precisely because it is the outer expression, and nothing 

 else than the outer expression, of the ' ' established " 

 that is, the necessary or logical order of Thought. In 

 other words, Thought and Things are but the necessary 

 complementary aspects of the one Totality of Existence. 



In short, what I have attempted to do is: To trace 

 out, and thus to render explicit, the speculative thread 

 that is already present implicitly as the vital principle 

 of the modern scientific movement. It will thus be 

 manifest that my purpose has not been "critical" so 

 much as interpretative. I have not been concerned to 

 discover the momentary weaknesses of that movement 

 so much as to find its central, permanent elements of 

 power. 



