AND ITS SELF-CONSERVATION. 107 



themselves. Indeed, in our present discussion, we 

 have seen that substance, so far as the extended world 

 presents its developed reality, is just the unity (relation) 

 of quality under the form of mutually opposed and yet 

 mutually inclusive forces, on the one hand, and quantity, 

 on the other hand, as measure or limitation, and hence as 

 a phase of differentiation, or the rendering explicit what 

 lies latent in substance. 



"Where" and "when" are manifestly relations re- 

 spectively of time and place. " Position " indicates atti- 

 tude or relative place, including relation of part to part 

 in the thing having position. " Possession " is but a rela- 

 tion between a superior (more complex) and an inferior 

 (less complex) phase of substance. So that thus far, we 

 have in reality but three categories as attributes of sub- 

 stance namely quantity, quality, and relation. 



At the same time it is noticeable that these three at- 

 tributive categories could have no existence apart from 

 substance, nor could substance exist without involving 

 what those categories imply. They are essential phases 

 of substance. 



So, too, the remaining categories show themselves at 

 once to be only mutually implying modes of substance. 

 For the reality of substance can be shown only in its 

 activity; and as substance contributes the sum-total of 

 reality, it must be no less truly passive than active, since, 

 as the total, it must receive the whole of its own activity. 

 Passion or passivity is simply sufferance or receptivity. 

 But receptivity is not merely passivity ; it is just as truly 

 activity. It is, in short, but another name for reaction. 

 It may be remarked by the way, then, that in his categories 

 Aristotle presents us with the simplest possible scheme 



