CAUSE OF ITS FAILURE. . 83 



may say, that sucli arguments, since they are as good as can be 

 brought in favor of such an opinion, show more clearly how entire the 

 failure was. I proceed now to 'endeavor to point out its causes. 



Sect. 2. Cause of the failure of the Greek Physical Philosophy. 



THE cause of the failure of so many of the attempts of the Greeks to 

 construct physical science is so important, that we must endeavor to 

 bring it into view here ; though the full development of such subjects 

 belongs rather to the Philosophy of Induction. The subject must, at 

 present, be treated very briefly. 



I will first notice some errors which may naturally occur to the 

 reader's mind, as possible causes of failure, but which, we shall be able 

 to show, were not the real reasons in this case. 



The cause of failure was not the neglect of facts. It is often said 

 that the Greeks disregarded experience, and spun their philosophy out 

 of their own thoughts alone ; and this is supposed by many to be their 

 essential error. It is, no doubt, true, that the disregard of experience 

 is a phrase which may be so interpreted as to express almost any defect 

 of philosophical method ; since coincidence with experience is requi- 

 site to the truth of all theory. But if we fix a more precise sense on 

 our terms, I conceive it may be shown that the Greek philosophy did, 

 in its opinions, recognize the necessity and paramount value of obser- 

 vations; did, in its origin, proceed upon observed facts; and did 

 employ itself to no small extent in classifying and arranging phenomena. 

 We must endeavor to illustrate these nssertions, because it is important 

 to show that these steps alone do not necessarily lead to science. 



1. The acknowledgment of experience as the main ground of physi- 

 cal knowledge is so generally understood to be a distinguishing feature 

 of later times, that it may excite surprise to find that Aristotle, and 

 other ancient philosophers, not only asserted in the most pointed man- 

 ner that all our knowledge must begin from experience, but also stated 

 in language much resembling the habitual phraseology of the most 

 modern schools of philosophizing, that particular facts must be col- 

 lected; that from these, general principles must be obtained by induc- 

 tion; and that these principles, when of the most general kind, are 

 axioms. A few passages will show this. 



" The way 11 must be the same," says Aristotle, in speaking of the 

 rules of reasoning, " with respect to philosophy, as it is with respect to 



11 Anal. Prior, i. 30. 



