36 THE GREEK SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY. 



Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers, did indeed collect facts ; bul 

 that they took no steps in classifying and comparing them ; and that 

 thus they failed to obtain from them any general knowledge. For, in 

 reality, the treatises of Aristotle which we have mentioned, are as re- 

 markable for the power of classifying and systematizing which they 

 exhibit, as for the industry shown in the accumulation. But it is not 

 classification of facts merely which can lead us to knowledge, except 

 we adopt that special arrangement, which, in each case, brings into 

 view the principles of the subject. We may easily show how unprofit- 

 able an arbitrary or random classification is, however orderly and sys- 

 tematic it may be. 



For instance, for a long period all unusual fiery appearances in the 

 sky were classed together as meteors. Comets, shooting-stars, and 

 globes of fire, and the aurora borealis in all its forms, were thus grouped 

 together, and classifications of considerable extent and minuteness were 

 proposed with reference to these objects. But this classification was 

 of a mixed and arbitrary kind. Figure, color, motion, duration, were 

 all combined as characters, and the imagination lent its aid, trans- 

 forming these striking appearances into fiery swords and spears, bears 

 and dragons, armies and chariots. The facts so classified were, not- 

 withstanding, worthless ; and would not have been one jot the less so, 

 had they and their classes been ten times as numerous as they were. 

 No rule or law that would stand the test of observation was or could 

 be thus discovered. Such classifications have, therefore, long been 

 neglected and forgotten. Even the ancient descriptions of these objects 

 of curiosity are unintelligible, or unworthy of trust, because the specta- 

 tors had no steady conception of the usual order of such phenomena. 

 For, however much we may fear to be misled by preconceived opin- 

 ions, the caprices of imagination distort our impressions far more than 

 the anticipations of reason. In this case men had, indeed we may say 

 with regard to many of these meteors, they still have, no science : not 

 for want of facts, nor even for want of classification of facts ; but because 

 the classification was one in which no real principle was contained. 



4. Since, as we have said before, two things are requisite to science, 

 Facts and Ideas ; and since, as we have seen, Facts were not want- 

 ing in the physical speculations of the ancients, we are naturally led 

 to ask, Were they then deficient in Ideas ? Was there a want among 

 them of mental activity, and logical connection of thought ? But it is 

 so obvious that the answer to this inquiry must be in the negative, 

 that we need not dwell upon it. No one who knows any thing of the 



