DOGMATISM OF THE STATIONARY PERIOD. 233 



tity does not prevent corporeal form from action altogether, but pre 

 vents it from being a universal agent, inasmuch as the form is individ- 

 ualized, which, in matter subject to quantity, it is. Moreover, the 

 illustration deduced from the ponderousness of bodies is not to the 

 purpose ; first, because the addition of quantity is not the cause of 

 gravity, as is proved in the fourth book, De Coelo and De Mundo" (we 

 see that he quotes familiarly the physical treatises of Aristotle) ; 

 " second, because it is false that ponderousness makes motion slower ; 

 on the contrary, in proportion as any thing is heavier, the more does 

 it move with its proper motion; thirdly, because action does not take 

 place by local motion, as Democritus asserted; but by this/that some- 

 thing is drawn from power into act." 



It does not belong to our purpose to consider either the theological 

 or the metaphysical doctrines which form so large a portion of the 

 treatises of the schoolmen. Perhaps it may hereafter appear, that 

 some light is thrown on some of the questions which have occupied 

 metaphysicians in all ages, by that examination of the history of the 

 Progressive Sciences in which we are now engaged ; but till we are 

 able to analyze the leading controversies of this kind, it would be oi 

 little service to speak of them in detail. It may be noticed, however, 

 that many of the most prominent of them refer to the great question, 

 "What is the relation between actual things and general terms?" 

 Perhaps in modern times, the actual things would be more commonly 

 taken as the point to start from ; and men would begin by considering 

 how classes and universals are obtained from individuals. But the 

 schoolmen, founding their speculations on the received modes of con 

 sidering such subjects, to which both Aristotle and Plato had con- 

 tributed, travelled in the opposite direction, and endeavored to discover 

 how individuals were deduced from genera and species; what was 

 "the Principle of Individuation." This was variously stated by 

 different reasoners. Thus Bonaventura 15 solves the difficulty by the 

 aid of the Aristotelian distinction of Matter and Form. The individ- 

 ual derives from the Form the property of being something, and from 

 the Matter the property of being that particular thing. Duns Scotus, 16 

 the great adversary of Thomas Aquinas in theology, placed the prin- 

 ciple of Individuation in " a certain determining positive entity," which 

 his school called ffcecceity or thisness. " Thus an individual man u 

 Peter, because his humanity is combined with Petreity" The force 



'* Deg. iv. 573. " Ib. iv. 523. 



