SWEDISH JURISPRUDENCE. 351 



that stress of which it is surely deserving, and I therefore 

 trust that the only penalty to which I can be subjected for 

 the casual accident which has happened, will be that already 

 adjudged by the Harads-Ratt, agreeably to Chap. 29, 2, of 

 the Criminal Code (M. B.), as the cases therein stated are 

 quite analogous to mine namely, ' a man firing a gun in a 

 place where shooting is lawful, and where it is not supposed 

 people are to be found.' 



" Whoever has taken part in bear hunting will willingly 

 coincide in the views of M. Falk, which are grounded on 

 many years' experience namely, that when in attacking a 

 bear, even should only a glimpse of the beast be visible, not 

 a moment is left for consideration; as also that to avoid 

 unnecessarily risking life, the greatest attention to orders, 

 the most rigid discipline and rapid decision in action, are 

 of the first moment to the parties engaged. With these 

 impressions, and fully convinced that on the occasion in 

 question, my old and faithful comrade, Svensson, would be 

 obedient to my instructions, I directed him, as shown by 

 the witnesses, to remain at a particular spot outside of the 

 Ring until farther orders. Knowing where he was, had I 

 from carelessness shot him at his post, I should naturally 

 have subjected myself to the most severe punishment. But 

 as when I fired my gun, it was in an opposite direction to 

 where I had left him a little before, and just at the spot he 

 himself had pointed out as the most probable for the bear to 

 be lying, and this with the full impression that the object 

 aimed at was the animal of which we were in search, it 

 seems to me that the decision of the Hof-Ratt in the matter 

 exceeds the bounds of moderation, and is in direct opposition 

 to the annexed judgment passed on Zacharias Jonsson, the 



