14 Chapter II. 



consequence of its former impetuous, but disastrous 

 attack; this complex representation excites the affec- 

 tion of fright, according to the same innate laws of 

 association, and the wasp escapes unscathed and the 

 chicken unstung. Essentially the same psychic laws 

 underlie the actions in each case, in that of the chicken 

 which was cautious at the first sight of the wasp, and in 

 that of the same chicken which controlled its impetuosity 

 after the painful experience of the wasp's sting. What 

 right then have psychologists to ascribe intelligence in 

 the latter case? From the standpoint of critical psy- 

 chology both processes must be reduced to the same 

 causes. It is merely an act of the sensile memory, 

 which distinguishes the doings in the second case from 

 those of the first. The sensile memory, it is true, is not 

 instinct in the stricter acceptance of the term; but it 

 clearly belongs to the range of instinctive sensation, 

 and not to intelligence. 



How then does it come to pass, that modern psy- 

 chology speaks of "intelligence," when the chicken is 

 induced by the wasp's sting to beware of all wasps in 

 future? Simply because this pseudo-science takes 

 sensile imagination for intelligence and arbitrarily puts 

 the following logical syllogisms into the chicken's brain : 

 That object has a striking resemblance to the thing 

 which stung me yesterday; now, I don't want to be 

 stung again : therefore I'll leave that thing alone today. 

 True, the reasoning power of man is able to resolve 

 the simple process of the sensile association of animals 

 into a logical deduction; but this fact merely warrants 

 the conclusion, that man is endowed with intelligence, 

 and not that the animal possesses it. Hence we must 



