20 Chapter II. 



elation of sense representations in which one element is 

 taken from experience. This association, however, is 

 of an instinctive nature, because it follows the laws of 

 unconscious association which belong to the sphere of 

 sensitive life; it has absolutely nothing to do with 

 intelligence in its proper meaning. 



Thus it is evident from these two examples that 

 modern animal psychology not only makes an arbitrary 

 use of the term "intelligence," but also that it shows no 

 little inconsistency in the explanation of psychic animal 

 activities. The dog that was induced by the smell of 

 the first bone to crunch it, made in the very act the 

 sensitive experience that the bone had a pleasant taste. 

 The ant, likewise, that was instinctively led by the smell 

 of the Lomechusa to lick it, enjoyed at once the sensitive 

 experience, that her action was highly agreeable. Con- 

 sequently, the actions of the dog and of the ant became, 

 in that very moment, according to modern psychology, 

 intelligent instead of instinctive actions; for the sensitive 

 agreeableness of the respective taste perceptions is an 

 clement of experience, and this element of experience 

 caused the dog and the ant to continue their formerly 

 instinctive actions. Hence it follows that instinctive 

 activity ceases to be instinctive in the very moment its 

 execution begins, and is changed into an intelligent ac- 

 tion. Consequently exterior instinctive actions cease to 

 be possible, they become at once intelligent; for the 

 performance of any instinctive activity is agreeable to 

 the animal, or averts displeasure from it, and it is pre- 

 cisely on account of this agreeble sensation that the 

 animal performs those very actions. To repeat it once 

 more: whosoever establishes the sensile experience of 



