What is Intelligence, and What is Instinct ? 35 



distinguished in name from the interior sense and from 

 the sensitive powers of imagination and memory, and 

 these, in turn, differ only in name, not in reality from 

 one another : they are different manifestations of the ac- 

 tivity of one and the same power of sensitive cognition. 



It will interest modern men of science to learn that 

 Thomas of Aquin attributed to animals the powers of 

 sensitive perception and appetite in the very same terms 

 as we have done, and that he divided the interior sense 

 powers in a similar manner. 1 This fact alone is 

 weighty evidence for the truth, that the cherished and 

 unceasingly repeated reproach of modern scientists 

 against scholastic philosophy of making a machine of 

 the animal, in letting it be exclusively guided by a 

 "blind instinct," is due to a total ignorance of the teach- 

 ings of that philosophy which it has become fashionable 

 to disparage and discredit. 



Consequently the instinctive actions of animals are 

 divided into two head groups : into instinctive actions 

 in the strict, and into instinctive actions in the wider 

 acceptance of the term. As instances of the former 

 class we have to regard those which immediately spring 

 from the inherited dispositions of the powers of sensile 

 cognition and appetite; and as instances of the latter 

 those which indeed proceed from the same inherited 

 dispositions, but through the medium of sense experi- 

 ence. The additional fact that a dog or an ant avails 

 itself in the furtherance of its innate instincts of new 

 combinations of representations which it has acquired 

 from sense experience by the aid of these same in- 



!) "Summ. Theol.," I. q. 78, a. 4. The question whether those four 

 faculties differ in reality, or only in name, is of minor importance. 



