What is Intelligence, and What is Instinct? 41 



nostrils, they begin to scratch themselves all over the 

 body. Their enjoyment of the smoke is apparent, for 

 they do not try to avoid it, but on the contrary direct 

 their nostrils towards the person who emits the smoke 

 of his cigar. When they are thus once accustomed to 

 enjoy the pleasure of tobacco at regular intervals, it is 

 not necessary to approach them with a burning cigar or 

 pipe, but the pretence of blowing at them is sufficient to 

 make them stretch forth their faces. And, finally, the 

 mere act of blowing at them is enough to make them 

 scratch themselves. Consequently, they drew the con- 

 clusion from the experience of the past, that anybody 

 who pretends to blow smoke from his mouth, does so 

 in reality. Of course, this was a wrong generalization, 

 but such mistakes are well known to happen even to 

 human beings. It is enough that so lowly organized 

 brutes as Prosimia can make generalizations." 



From these observations Haacke wishes in full earn- 

 est to prove that "mental processes of generalization" 

 are to be met with in animal life. Yet, scientific animal 

 psychology is unable to accept such phenomena as a 

 proof of mental generalisations. They are nothing 

 more than combinations of a sensitive imagination. 

 They are totally different from mental powers of ab- 

 straction, and even furnish a conclusive proof of the 

 utter impotence of animals to make "mental generaliza- 

 tions" at all. By mistaking combinations of sensitive 

 representations (sense images) for general concepts, 

 and by erroneously identifying the two, Haacke himself 

 made a wrong generalization; an occurrence which is 

 indeed not very uncommon to modern animal psycholo- 

 gists. Let us, accordingly, submit the psychic processes 



