What is Intelligence, and W hat is Instinct? 43 



perceptions, feelings, sense images, of images of the sen- 

 sile memory and of acts of the sensile appetite, and evi- 

 dently belongs to the sphere of sensitive instinct. Such in- 

 stinctive activities of animals are due to complex sense 

 representations and are, as they always were, called in 

 scholastic philosophy "expectatio casuum similium!' 

 It would hardly have befallen a savant of antiquity or 

 of the Middle Ages to ascribe such psychic processes 

 in animals to a power of mental abstraction. This feat 

 was reserved to modern animal psychology which looks 

 down with contempt upon the "old school philosophy," 

 and imagines it can do better without it. Well, Haacke's 

 "mentally generalizing" Makis prove what absurd 

 achievements are the result. Through an erroneous and 

 arbitrary method of interpretation he first endowed his 

 Makis with a mental power of abstraction, then he dis- 

 solved their whole process of sensitive association into a 

 series of logical conclusions and finally maintained that 

 it was the animal which had thus concluded, whilst ap- 

 parently it was Mr. Haacke himself. 



Had the good Makis been able to "think" at all, 

 they would have been clever enough to scratch them- 

 selves only zvhen a person approached with a burning 

 pipe or cigar and then blew the smoke at them. The 

 intelligent Makis could not have failed to perceive the 

 relation between cause and effect, and ought to have 

 made the following conclusion : Tobacco-smoke is never 

 in evidence, unless a burning pipe or cigar is in sight ; 

 now it is only tobacco-smoke that produces such a pleas- 

 ant sensation of tickling upon our epidermis ; therefore 

 we shall not scratch ourselves when Mr. Haacke ap- 

 proaches without a pipe or cigar, and only blows air on 



