54: Chapter IV. 



penetrable metaphysical substratum," the only ''thing 

 as such." Therefore, in his opinion, "the everlasting 

 dualistic strife between materialists and spiritualists is 

 absolutely without object." "Everything is soul, just 

 as everything is force and matter. Not one of these 

 inseparable notions is more fundamental, or higher than 

 the rest, because they are identical." 1 



If all notions are really identical, then, indeed, there 

 is no possibility of critical distinction between them. 

 If we and the whole outer world are only a product 

 of the nerve activity of our brain cells, the reality of 

 which we can no longer account for, we have arrived 

 at absolute skepticism, a point at which all scientific 

 controversy has an end. Thus, while this "monistic 

 consideration of the world" affords undoubtedly the 

 best protection to modern psychology, because it serves 

 as a safeguard from any attack that is based upon a 

 critical analysis of notions, it necessarily involves its 

 own destruction, because it abandons, at least from a 

 logical point of view, all objectively scientific knowledge 

 of the phenomena of nature. 



After these preliminary remarks let us enter upon 

 Forel's defence of animal intelligence. He attaches 

 great importance to the circumstance that not only 

 "automatisms of instincts," but what he calls "plastic 

 neurozymic activities" are a factor in animal life. Forel 

 avows that the human soul is more plastic than the 

 animal soul, but he also maintains that the latter is not 

 without "plasticity." The souls of the higher monkeys 

 are extremely plastic, capable of development and train- 

 ing, and endowed with few instincts. Very plastic are 



l ) See e. g., p. 27 and 28. 



