56 Chapter IV. 



experience of the individual. It is, therefore, identical 

 with the erroneously called "intelligence" of modern 

 psychology. Such plastic neurozymic activities un- 

 doubtedly underlie all intelligent actions, but they occur 

 also in innumerable activities of instinctive sentiency. 

 Not a single act of the sensile memory is conceivable 

 without "plastic neurozymic activity." Therefore the 

 substitution of the novel term "plastic neurozymic ac- 

 tivity" is no proof whatsoever for animal intelligence. 

 Moreover the point at issue in our discussion of the 

 difference between instinct and intelligence is by no 

 means the question, whether higher animals are able 

 to perfect their innate instincts by individual sense 

 experience in a greater degree than lower animals a 

 fact which we never disputed but, whether every suit- 

 able action of the animal that is due to sense experience 

 must be accepted as an intelligent action, or not. This 

 is the question which must be answered. Forel, how- 

 ever, evades the solution by stating that only prejudice 

 and blindness could deny the numerous plastic neuro- 

 zymic activities of higher animals. We cannot accept 

 this statement as a final answer, but must in turn, 

 demand of our learned friend Professor Forel a closer 

 consideration of the analysis of psychological concepts. 

 But what about the objection that we attribute to 

 ants "ratiocinations similar to the human," which are, 

 of course, far beyond them? The answer flows spon- 

 taneously from our previous psychological analysis. 

 Forel 1 belongs to that class of moderate modern ani- 

 mal psychologists who, on the one hand, join us in pro- 



l ) Beside the previous quotation see also his little essay, "Ameisc 

 und Menscb, oder Automatismus und Vernunft." Zuerich, 1889. 



