68 Chapter IV. 



meme beauconp plus qu'on n'est tente de croire, quand 

 on observe le mecanisme regulierement reproduit de 

 leurs instincts." Now this fact which induces Prof. 

 Forel to state that these insects "reason," implies 

 nothing beyond the association of sense representations, 

 which follows the hereditary laws of instinctive sen- 

 tiency. Forel does not prove that ants really make 

 formal conclusions whilst these associations of repre- 

 sentations are going on. But it was precisely this that 

 he had to prove. For the so-called material conclusions, 

 or such processes of cognition as ive can resolve into 

 formal syllogisms, occur even in those activities of ani- 

 mals that are directly due to the hereditary disposition 

 of animal instinct. Nor does Prof. Forel deny that 

 they are merely instinctive. 



Consequently, in stating that "les insectes raison- 

 nent," Forel either ascribes to animals "ratiocinations 

 similar to the human," or he uses the term "raisonner" 

 in a wrong sense. Moreover it is untenable to con- 

 struct, as Forel does both here and elsewhere, an 

 artificial contrast between the "mechanism" or the 

 "automatism" of instinct and the manifestations of this 

 mechanism which have been brought about by "plastic 

 neurozymic activities" or, in other words, by the sense 

 experience of the animal. They belong to one and the 

 same range of sensile perception. There is no real 

 contrast between them, but only between instinct and 

 intelligence in the proper sense of the word. Nor can 

 the anatomy of the brain ever demonstrate the true 

 nature of intelligence; it can be gathered only from a 

 clear analysis of psychological concepts. 



Our worthy friend, Prof. Forel, continues in his 



