Examination of Some Objections. 73 



of instinctive actions sensu lato; and it is consequently 

 erroneous to call the former "instinctive," the latter 

 "intelligent." This is the mistake made by modern 

 psychology. 



Only those actions are "intelligent" which contain 

 a new and a higher psychic element, and this element 

 is "choice." But, then, our definition of intelligence 

 coincides with that of Prof. Wheeler. How are we to 

 explain this seeming contradiction? "Choice" in the 

 true sense of the word, not in the perverted meaning 

 which "pseudo-psychology" has given to it, necessarily 

 presupposes intelligence sensu stricto; for choice de- 

 mands a selection which cannot be achieved without a 

 faculty that is able to reflect, and all reflection essen- 

 tially presupposes a power of abstraction. Therefore 

 we are forced by the simplest laws of logic to conclude 

 that no choice is possible without a power of abstraction. 



Consequently, Prof. Wheeler is mistaken in refus- 

 ing to admit our definition of intelligence as "a power 

 of abstraction or ratiocination." By calling "choice" 

 the distinctive mark of intelligence, he has given our 

 definition in another form. Therefore he, too, must 

 exclude from the term "intelligent actions" all those ac- 

 tivities which can be adequately explained by the laws 

 of sensitive association without the aid of formal elec- 

 tion or abstraction. 



Let us apply these conclusions to Prof. Wheeler's 

 ideas on psychogenesis. He arrived, he says (p. 813), 

 "at the same conclusion as Wasmann, that there are no 

 evidences of ratiocination in ants." Hence we may 

 say that Professor Wheeler has found no evidence of 

 intelligence in ants. For intelligence supposes ratio- 



