76 Chapter V. 



Wasmann to deny animal intelligence; for the greater 

 part of the so-called intelligent actions of animals can 

 by no means claim that title. By the way, a similar 

 remark had previously been made by Forel in speaking 

 of ants. But, are there no facts which go to prove 

 the intelligence of certain animals? The answer de- 

 pends upon how we define instinct. It is Wasmann's 

 merit to have opened the way to a more earnest dis- 

 cussion of the question by his explanatory remarks." 



"Wasmann understands by instinct not only the so- 

 called blind impulses which the animal possesses ante- 

 cedent to all experience and as innate properties, but 

 also the power of performing those suitable actions 

 which are due to experience, to memory, and to asso- 

 ciations of sense images. Such actions are not to be 

 regarded as intelligent, because they do not transcend 

 the realm of sense perceptions. Intelligence exists, ac- 

 cording to Wasmann, only where general concepts are 

 met with, consequently only in those actions which de- 

 mand a power of abstraction. Man alone can abstract ; 

 at least we know of no action of animals which can not 

 be explained in a simpler way than by assuming a 

 power of abstraction. Man is also endowed with in- 

 stinct, and acts instinctively, when his mental activity 

 is restricted to associations of sense images. Therefore 

 Wasmann regards the greater part of what goes for 

 "intelligence of animals" as a special form of instinct 

 which differs from innate impulses in being due to ex- 

 perience and in being acquired by the individual animal. 

 The difference between man and animal consists in this, 

 that the latter has nothing beyond its innate impulses 

 and those which have been acquired and are due to asso- 



