General Sense Images and the Power of Abstraction. 83 



stinctive association of representations without grasping 

 their relations, and without rising to self -consciousness; 

 in short, because he possesses only a sensitive and not a 

 spiritual power of cognition. 



How is it, then, with Emery's first difficulty: As 

 sensitive associations of representations and spiritual 

 abstractions are most intimately connected with one an- 

 other in the psychic life of man, we cannot simply deny 

 the existence of these abstractions in the psychic life of 

 animals ? But why not ? Emery's conclusion is clearly 

 unwarranted. We are not allowed to attribute higher 

 faculties to animals than they manifest, and as the 

 manifestations of their mental activity do not transcend 

 the sphere of sensitive life, it is unlawful to ascribe in- 

 telligence and spiritual faculties to them, although both 

 these activities are found and are intimately connected 

 in man. This is what a scientific and critical psychol- 

 ogy postulates. 



Let us now turn to the second point in Prof. 

 Emery's objections : that syllogisms are contained at 

 least implicitly in the sensitive associations of animals : 

 that there is no essential, but only an exterior difference 

 between the so-called material and the proper (formal) 

 conclusions of the human intellect: that, consequently, 

 the cognitive power of animals is not essentially differ- 

 ent from human intelligence. 



We readily admit, that the combinations of sense 

 representations in animals are implicitly equivalent to 

 formal conclusions. Yet, we positively deny, that there 

 is only an exterior and unessential difference between 

 such a process of cognition and the explicit conclusions 

 of the human intellect. A careful examination of what 



