Intelligence and Speech. 109 



their thoughts to other intelligent beings, that is, they 

 will experience the necessity of language. 1 



II. Properly speaking, there is no necessity of al- 

 luding to Emery's second assertion that higher animals 

 have at least abstractions of the first order, and act 

 intelligently not only in appearance, but in truth, be- 

 cause this statement is sufficiently explained by his 

 error in taking so-called general sense images for genu- 

 ine abstractions. The former have nothing to do with 

 a spiritual power of abstraction; they are only the 

 foundation, the raw material, as it were, of its charac- 

 teristic activity. Hence, Emery's "abstractions of the 

 first order in animals" are no abstractions at all, nor do 

 they belong to the sphere of intellectual life, but to the 

 instinctive activity of the senses. It is true that "ab- 

 stractions of the first order" are met with in man which 

 are undoubtedly abstractions in the proper sense of the 

 word. To this class belong our first intellectual con- 

 cepts and judgments on the properties of things that can 

 be perceived by the senses, as : "The leaf is green," 

 "Sugar is sweet." Such intellectual concepts and judg- 

 ments presuppose complex sense representations, from 

 which they are abstracted. But does the fact that gen- 

 eral sense images in man develop into proper abstrac- 

 tions of the first order furnish an argument for the 

 same process in the psychic life of animals ? Emery 

 does not substantiate his assertion by a single proof. 

 Consequently we are justified in saying that it is an 

 arbitrary humanization of the animal. Even Emery in- 



l ) This is also confirmed by the fact that some children framed a 

 language for themselves (see Giesswein op. cit., p. 195 ff., and Gut- 

 berlet, p. 378 ff.), 



